
APSA

European Politics & Society

Newsletter of the European Politics and Society Section of the American Political Science Association

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Message from the Chair

Sheri Berman
Barnard College

THE last years have been interesting times for Europeanists. In many ways, our field is more exciting than ever. Europe is going through its most difficult crisis in decades, leading citizens across the continent to question institutions, norms and elites that many have long taken for granted. As a result, scholars in our field are faced with more difficult questions than ever: What does democracy mean in Europe today? How can Europe rebalance its economies to ensure both growth and equity? Is Europe's decades-long experiment in unification reached the end of its natural life? Can or should a European identity be created? How can immigrants and minority groups be better integrated into European polities? These are questions of fundamental import, and they are leading Europeanists to undertake scholarship that promises not only to advance our understanding of what is going on in Europe, but also to build bridges to scholars in other fields asking similar "high stakes" questions.

On the other hand, as we all know, the field of European Studies has been in contraction for many years. The number of students studying Europe and the amount of resources devoted to European studies is in decline. Part of this is natural—the result of growing interest in other parts of the globe and a reorientation of American interests after the Cold War. But as one era ends, another may be beginning. As Europe undergoes a period of questioning and reorientation Europeanists are turning back to "big" and "fundamental" questions, and this is leading to more and richer connections between scholars studying Europe and scholars studying other parts of the world. This will hopefully (continue to) reinvigorate our field, as well as create more fruitful ties between it and other subfields of the discipline.

This trend was reflected in European Politics

and Society panels scheduled for the 2012 conference. Topics included European Democratization, Democracy and Economic Crisis, Political Extremism and Minority Rights, Reorganizing Capitalism, The Formation of a European Identity, and New Approaches to State Building. Although the conference was canceled, I have no doubt that the European Society and Politics panels at the 2013 conference will be equally broad and exciting.

These panels will be organized by our incoming chair, Professor Jeffrey Kopstein of the University of Toronto. Most members of the section will be familiar with Jeff's work, which spans both "halves" of the continent and an extremely large number of issues. We are very fortunate that he has agreed to take over panel organizing duties for 2013 and leadership duties for the year after. I hope you all inundated him with submissions for the 2013 conference!

One of the most important things we do at the annual APSA conference is celebrate outstanding work in our field. Because we didn't get to meet this past August, I want to give a special "shout out" to our 2012 prize winners.

Our best book award last year went to David Stasavage of NYU for his *States of Credit: Size, Power and the Development of European Polities* (Princeton University Press).

Our best dissertation award went to Jordan Gans-Morse (PhD University of CA, Berkeley, currently at Northwestern) for "Building Property Rights: Capitalists and the Demand for Law in Post-Soviet Russia."

Our best paper from the 2011 conference went to Christilla Roeder-Rynning (Syddansk Universitet) and Frank Schimmelfennig (Swiss Federal Institute for Technology) for "Bringing Co-Decision to Agriculture: A Hard Case of Parliamentarization."

Nominations for 2013 EP&S awards are also still open. Deadlines for submission are March 1. Nominations for each award should be sent

to *each* committee member. Electronic or hard copy submissions are acceptable. More details are available later in the newsletter and [here](#).

Starting with the 2013 conference, European Politics and Society is instituting a new award to honor one of the great Europeanists of the past decades, Peter Mair, who died in 2011. The Peter Mair memorial award will provide funding to enable two young scholars to attend the APSA meeting. The award is designed to enable young scholars of European politics without alternative funding to present a paper in one of the panels organized by the EP&S section.

First-time APSA-attendants who are graduate students or junior professors from underfunded European universities (notably in the East and South) will be prioritized, but senior scholars from such institutions, as well as junior scholars from underfunded non-European universities (including the US), will also be considered. Applicants are expected to also apply to all other travel funds they are eligible for, including their department/university, national science foundations, and the APSA Travel Fund. The Awards are set at a maximum of \$1,000 each, but partial/matching funding is possible too (and could lead to a larger number of grants).

Applications for the Peter Mair Memorial Award should include:

- Name, position, and academic affiliation;
- Title of proposed paper and EPS-Panel it was submitted to;
- Letter from Head of Department confirming that there are no/not sufficient university funds;
- List of other funding agencies you have applied to;
- Indicate whether this would be your first APSA attendance

The award committee is composed of: Cas Mudde, University of Georgia, Gabriel Goodliffe, ITAM (Mexico), and Henry Farrell,

George Washington University.

Looking forward to seeing many of you at the 2013 APSA conference in Chicago. Please let me, Dan Kelemen (our fabulous newsletter editor), or incoming President Jeffrey Kopstein know if you have any suggestions for the section or the newsletter.

Message from the Editor

*R. Daniel Kelemen
Rutgers University*

IN the last issue of this newsletter, the *European Forum* focused on the eurozone crisis. In this issue, the *Forum* explores a second major crisis—the crisis of democracy in Eastern Europe. While much of the world’s (limited) attention to Europe has focused on the first crisis, the second has been quietly intensifying. Indeed, the two crises are related in several respects. Economic fallout from the euro crisis has spilled over into eastern Europe, producing economic conditions which have helped foster illiberal and anti-democratic political movements. The fact that the EU has been bogged down in efforts to resolve the eurozone crisis has diverted attention away from growing threats to democracy in new EU member states and prospective members and weakened the EU’s resolve to address these threats. We are fortunate to have contributions from a stellar cast of Europeanists—Jan Kubik, Mitchell Orenstein, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Kim Scheppele and Milada Vachudova. Collectively, their contributions analyze developments in Hungary, Romania, Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, the Western Balkans, Central Asia and more. They paint a nuanced and very mixed picture of trends across Eastern Europe, from the very troubling developments in Hungary to the positive ones in Poland. Taken together, their contributions make it clear that nearly twenty-five years after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the transitions to and consolidations of democracy in the region remain incomplete and, in

some cases, face grave threats.

I thank all the contributors to this issue of the newsletter, and I thank my outstanding doctoral student, Alex Jakubow, for his editorial work. We welcome your suggestions of topics for future European Forums or of other material to include in future newsletters.

European Forum

Threats to Democracy in Eastern Europe

Not Your Father's Authoritarianism: The Creation of the "Frankenstate"

Kim Lane Scheppelle

Princeton University

WE think we know what authoritarianisms are. Ideological leaders, backed by the military and security services, whip the masses into obedience with threats and propaganda. Dissidents are rounded up, imprisoned and tortured. Populations are trapped within national borders and repressed to the point of docility. Freedom dies.

Sophisticated 21st century authoritarians, like their 20th century counterparts, are leaders who want to stay in power for the foreseeable future and who will do whatever it takes to realize that goal. But, having learned the lessons of earlier authoritarianisms, they now achieve their ambitions without brute force. If they can simply maintain the formal trappings of democratic government while undermining democracy in "technical" ways, they can reign forever. And one of the most effective ways to do that is to create a Frankensteinian state, or a "Frankenstate."

A Frankenstate is an abusive form of rule, created by combining the bits and pieces of perfectly reasonable democratic institutions in monstrous ways, much as Frankenstein's monster was created from bits and pieces of other living things. No one part is objectionable; the horror emerges from the combinations. As a result, if one approaches the monster with a checklist, the monster will pass the test (elections, CHECK; parliamentary government, CHECK). But the combinations—free elections with a paucity of parties; a unicameral parliament without independent "transparency institutions" like ombudsmen and audit offices—are where the problems lie. Not all democracies have more than two parties; not all democracies have independent ombudsman. Does every democracy therefore require these things? No. But combining elements one finds in reasonable democratic states in an ugly new way creates a Frankenstate that is hard to criticize with our available conceptual frameworks.

Armed with this knowledge about how to hide a non-democracy in plain sight, the new authoritarians create Frankenstates that are neither fully repressive nor fully free. These are not your father's authoritarians, bolstered by an overweening ideology and efficient direct repression. These are governments that appear democratic but that provide hopeless odds for anyone to challenge the existing distribution of power effectively. These are governments against which checklists of democracy are helpless.

The government of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz political party in Hungary is a Frankenstate in point. Brought to power in spring 2010 in a free and fair election, Orbán turned 40% popular approval into a 53% party-list vote, which, under Hungary's disproportionate election law, gave his Fidesz party 68% of the seats in a unicameral parliament. Under the rules of the game, Hungary's constitution could be changed with a two-thirds vote. The election therefore gave Orbán the ability to change everything. And so he did. Almost three years later, Hungary has a new constitution and more than 400 new laws. The upshot of all of this legal change is that power is concentrated in Orbán's hands. He and his party used legal, democratic means to capture a democratic state for themselves, all without appearing to change the key features that make Hungary look like a democracy.

To both the European Union and to his detractors at home and abroad, Orbán has claimed the mantle of legitimacy, since he won an election fair and square. But when one looks under the surface, both at the election he won and at what he has done since, a much darker picture emerges.


Hungary had been a major success story among the post-1989 transition states. A reasonably stable six-party, tri-polar political system emerged in the 1990s, with nationalist/conservative, liberal and post-communist parties coexisting in a broad political spectrum, peacefully alternating power across five elections. Only once in the first five post-communist elections did a governing party win a second term in office. Hungarians got very accustomed to throwing the bums out at the end of each term and having viable alternative parties at each election.

But not all was well under the surface of Hungary's party system. Hungary's varied political parties collapsed one after another in the late 1990s and beyond, under the weight of exhaustion. None of the parties managed to successfully groom the next generation of leaders to take the place of their founding generations. As a result, when the first post-communist generations in each of the parties stepped back from public life, their parties collapsed with them. By the 2010 election, Hungary was functionally a two-and-a-half party state. The Socialists had been governing for eight years, but—having burned through three prime ministers trying to stay in office—they now had a completely new and inexperienced leadership, with a party head only in his 30s. The neo-fascist party, Jobbik, spewed toxic political ideas from its new-to-politics leadership team. Fidesz, which had been the youth party in 1989, was still operating under its one and only leader Viktor Orbán, who was then only 48. At the time of the 2010 election, then, only one party—Fidesz—had any real political savvy or experience. And only one party—Fidesz—had a party leader with public name-recognition.

The outgoing Socialists, who had governed from 2002-2008, were mired in corruption and had been the party on whose watch the economy caved in (see figure 1 below). An economic collapse in which GDP growth dropped from +4% to -5% in the space of two years was not going to be kind to the party in power, even if it had good leadership.

As a result, Fidesz won the election almost by default, as the only real party left standing when the Socialists hit an economic wall and Jobbik proved too toxic for even a nationalist public. So yes, Orbán won fair and square in the way that only candidates with no viable competition can. What happened after that resulted from a weakness of constitutional design combined with the evil genius of smart lawyers.

The Hungarian political system since 1989 was a unicameral parliamentary system in which the primary meaningful check on political power had been a very powerful Constitutional Court. As was befitting a democracy with a powerful court, the constitution had an easy amendment rule. A single two-thirds vote of the Parliament could change anything. That rule made sense as a safety valve for overriding decisions of the Constitutional Court that supermajorities opposed (though the Constitutional Court had such public legitimacy that this only happened once in 20+ years). The system worked well while it worked well. But it was also vulnerable. If the Court could be captured, the main check on power would be gone. And if the Parliament could be packed with a single party that reached the constitutional amendment threshold, then all bets were off.



The structure of power in the Hungarian constitutional order was something Orbán knew intimately, since he had been in on the initial design in 1989 and then spent years working out in detail how to undermine it. During his eight years in the political wilderness from 2002-2010, his party hired phalanxes of private law firms to draft a plan that would permit the capture of the government. Because the plan was divided up into many small pieces, each of which was contracted out to a different law firm, it is not clear if the lawyers outside the party really understood what they were doing. The end result, once the plan was unveiled in hundreds of complex laws, was a system Orbán completely controlled.

Once Orbán won his magical two-thirds, he put his plan into action. But the Constitutional Court emerged as the key barrier. So Orbán wasted no time in bringing the Court to heel. The Parliament changed the system for election of judges to the Court so that the votes of their party were alone enough to place party loyalists on the bench. The number of judges on the Court was then expanded from 11 to 15, giving Fidesz a windfall of four new judges to name. Cutting the jurisdiction of the Court in some key areas—all made easy with the reliable two-thirds vote of the Parliament—came next. And then, when the new constitution came into effect on 1 January 2012, the wide jurisdiction of the Court to review virtually all laws in the abstract was axed.

At first, the Court fought back, issuing some brave decisions that temporarily blocked Orbán's plans. But each time, the Parliament either amended the constitution to nullify the Court decision or stripped more jurisdiction from the Court. This spring (2013), Orbán's forces will have finally named a supermajority of judges to the Court, making it highly unlikely that the Court will be able to get in Orbán's way any longer.

Other institutions that are part-and-parcel of a typical democratic order were reorganized to entrench Fidesz as well. The ombudsman, state audit office, public prosecutor, media board, election commission, monetary council, budget council, and judicial administration office were all "strengthened" as is befitting a good democracy. In fact, the prior occupants of these offices were

ousted if they were not Fidesz loyalists, and the new occupants were greeted with extended terms of office and a manner of appointment that guaranteed Fidesz was able to fill every single one of these jobs from among their own party faithful. Had Orbán chosen to eliminate any of these offices or weaken their powers, he might have been caught out as an autocrat. But simply "strengthening" these offices with supermajority appointments and long terms of office appeared to be ensuring their independence.

The judiciary was also reorganized to be more "modern" and "efficient." The retirement age was suddenly lowered to get rid of judges whose legal training was, according to Fidesz, out of date. This move also had the effect of removing much of the judiciary's established leadership which, combined with the creation of a new judicial administration office led by one of their own, then allowed Fidesz to replace many court leaders with people who now owe their careers to the party. Fidesz then made the courts more "efficient" by giving the head of the newly created National Judicial Office as well as their favorite public prosecutor the power to assign any case to any court, a move which, party leaders explained, was designed to reduce judicial backlogs. In these two steps—replacing the judicial leadership and giving their own appointees the power to move any case to any court—Fidesz invented a judicial machine to ensure that all politically sensitive cases were under their control, while simultaneously preaching the doctrine of efficiency.

When the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice found the sudden lowering of the judicial retirement age to be a violation of the Hungarian constitution and EU law respectively, Orbán complained but ultimately complied by returning the fired judges to the bench—just not in their old leadership positions. One can imagine that these new judges will be sentenced to a load of routine cases of no interest to Fidesz. And the EU can applaud the fact that Hungary is now in compliance with EU law.

I could go on, but you can see how Hungary has become a Frankenstate. Orbán and his party loyalists respond to criticism by pointing to some other democratic state that does just what they did—reorganize judicial administration, lengthen the terms of the "transparency institutions," require a two-thirds vote for all important matters. But as is befitting the image of the Frankenstate, it is the horrible combination of these things that makes Orbán's government only superficially a democracy. Under that surface, Orbán and his party have entrenched themselves for the long term, occupying all of the choke-points of power and writing all of the rules to avoid challenge.

There will be elections in 2014, since the appearance of democracy requires it. And there is a "democratic opposition" (opposition groups excluding Jobbik) that is trying to pull itself together to challenge Orbán's dominance. The opposition operates under surveillance and under ever-shifting electoral rules designed to throw them off-balance. But even if, against all odds, the democratic opposition wins the next election, Orbán's people will be dug into every office that must approve what a new government does next.

One example: An Orbán-created budget council, filled entirely with party loyalists, has the power to veto any budget passed by the Parliament if that budget adds to the debt. But the law creating the budget council does not provide deadlines for these vetoes. At the same time, the new constitution says that a budget must be passed by Parliament by 31 March of every year, and if the Parliament cannot reach agreement on a budget, the national President (another Fidesz loyalist who will remain in power until 2016) can dissolve the Parliament and call new elections. With this one measure alone, a non-Fidesz government can be deposed in its first year when the Orbánites snap the trap. And there are many more legal tricks like that built into this complex, redundant

and Fidesz-entrenching system.

So—is Hungary a democracy? It will go on having elections that will be contested. It will go on having courts that will follow the (new) law. It will probably continue to employ public relations firms on multiple continents that put forward the image of Hungary as the state that finally got rid of corruption and communism in one fell swoop, modernizing and making more efficient a previously ineffective government. But for those who are leaving the country in droves because they oppose the government, the only difference between the authoritarianisms of the past and the authoritarianism of the present is that the current government says all the right things when its officials speak English and it holds open the door to Europe and to the world, through which its opponents are now free to leave.

Victor Frankenstein's monster brought fear and horror to all those who saw it. But Viktor Orbán's monster state does Frankenstein one better. Orbán has mastered the art of legal suture so well that his Frankenstate can live and work in the European Union. People can tell that there is something not normal about this state, but it is hard to say what it is. It looks like a democracy; it talks like a democracy. It doesn't look or act like your father's authoritarianism. It is the new, improved, democratic-edition Frankenstate.

Learning from Mistakes: Romanian Democracy and the Hungarian Precedent

Grigore Pop-Eleches

Princeton University

A joke that circulated in Eastern Europe in the 1980s quipped that the capitalist countries were on the edge of the abyss, while the communist countries were, as usual, a couple of steps ahead. These days, it is tempting to apply the joke to the state of democracy in Eastern Europe: Romanian democracy is on the edge of the abyss and, as usual, neighboring Hungary is a couple of steps ahead. Of course, transplanting jokes into new contexts has its limitations: at least judging by the latest Freedom House democracy scores, both Hungary and Romania are still categorized as Free, and Hungary's score is still slightly higher than Romania's. And we need to be careful about using terms like 'democratic collapse' or 'dictatorship'—both because such terms have frequently been used for partisan reasons in East European politics¹ and to reserve them for the appropriate moments so we don't end up like the boy who called wolf.

But if it is premature to talk about dictatorships, there is little doubt that at least the liberal component of democracy is under siege in both countries. Thus, even limited proxies like democracy and governance scores offer a much more somber picture of the Hungarian situation: since Fidesz's rise to power after the 2010 elections, the country's ratings for press freedom and judicial independence have declined sharply,² reflecting the systematic efforts by Fidesz's parliamentary super-majority to control the judicial system and intimidate critical mass media outlets. The domestic ingredients for the Hungarian crisis, which have been discussed by a growing number of commentators, were an unfortunate combination of a corruption and economic crisis-fueled implosion of the Hungarian Socialist Party. The effects of that implosion were exacerbated by a semi-majoritarian electoral system that gave the right-wing Fidesz over 68% of seats (based on a

¹See, for example, the oft-repeated and broadly unfounded charges against Romania's President, Traian Băsescu, as a dictator.

²Thus, for the first time since 1996, Hungary was characterized as only "partially free" in Freedom House's Press Freedom Survey in 2011 (and its 13 point decline on the 100-point scale was the largest two-year decline among all the countries surveyed in 2011).

53% vote share) in the 2010 election, which allowed it to rewrite the Constitution in a way that removed most remaining institutional checks and balances. While these moves were criticized repeatedly by both the European Parliament and the European Commission, the EU was ultimately ineffective in getting Orbán to back down.

After the parliamentary elections of December 2012, Romania is in many ways where Hungary was in mid-2010. It has a new government with a two-thirds parliamentary majority for the center-left Social-Liberal Union (USL) coalition. The parliamentary power imbalance is exacerbated by the fact that the mainstream opposition—a center-right coalition formed around the former governing Democratic Liberal Party (PDL)—secured less than 20% of parliamentary seats, thereby leaving both countries without the type of "robust competition" that is vital to keeping governments accountable and honest.³ Like in Hungary, the new government seems to waste no time in trying to use its popular mandate to pursue constitutional reform. While the Romanian Constitution is certainly in need of some revisions, the interim governance record of the USL (from May to December 2012), which was punctuated by virulent attacks on key democratic institutions not controlled by the parliamentary majority (including the Presidency, the judicial system and the Ombudsman)⁴, suggests that this constitutional reform will be primarily aimed at consolidating the temporary political advantage of the current government. So is the Hungarian story bound to repeat itself?

My answer is a cautiously optimistic "not necessarily." There are three main reasons why things may play out differently. First, unlike in Hungary, constitutional revisions in Romania have to be approved not only by a two-thirds parliamentary majority but also by a popular referendum subject to a 50% turnout requirement. Given that the USL government fell short of this threshold in its effort to suspend the highly unpopular President Bănescu last July, it is uncertain whether they would be able to do better with the constitutional amendment, especially if the constitutional changes are as controversial as the Hungarian Constitution of 2011.

Second, the USL, which was largely forged as a negative coalition against President Bănescu and is composed of (at least nominally) social-democratic, liberal and conservative parties, is much more heterogeneous than the Hungarian Fidesz. Even if we dismiss the relevance of ideological labels in East European politics, Orbán's tight control over Fidesz stands in stark contrast to the barely concealed power struggle both between and within the parties in the USL coalition. This greater uncertainty about the durability of the Romanian governing coalition and about the political fate of the individual parties in the event of a break-up should temper the majoritarian temptations to a much greater extent than in the case of Fidesz.⁵

The third and probably most important difference is the likely role of Western reactions to significant democratic slippages. Whereas the West was initially slow to react and later ineffective vis-à-vis Orbán's power grab in Hungary, its response to the events surrounding the July referendum to suspend President Bănescu was a lot more resolute. The net result was that the Romanian government backed down on several crucial issues, such as its efforts to remove the 50% threshold requirement and its attempt to intimidate the Constitutional Court into validating the referendum despite the failure to achieve 50% turnout. In part, this may have been the result of the hasty

³See Anna Grzymala-Busse, *Rebuilding Leviathan: Party competition and state exploitation in post-communist democracies*, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

⁴See Kim Scheppele's post in the NYT for a good English-language summary of some of these steps.

⁵For an argument in this sense in the context of post-communist institutional design see Timothy Frye "A Politics of Institutional Choice Post-Communist Presidencies." *Comparative Political Studies* 30.5 (1997): 523-552.

and amateurish way in which the Romanian government orchestrated the impeachment and the referendum, but it also suggests that the EU (and the US) may have learned a lesson from the Hungarian case.


But even if a complete repetition of the "Hungarian model" is unlikely in Romania, this hardly means that the prospects of liberal democracy are rosy. Romania embarked on its democratic crisis from a considerably worse starting point in terms of democratic governance than Hungary had in 2010, so Romania can afford less backsliding before the situation becomes critical. Moreover, even if a wholesale constitutional reconfiguration of the political order fails, the Romanian government is likely to embark on a piecemeal process to chip away at the most "uncomfortable" political institutions. If the Ponta government learns from its procedural mistakes from last summer (and from its Hungarian counterparts) and embarks on a more carefully executed strategy that is harder to contest procedurally, the long-term consequences for Romanian democracy could still be serious. Given that many of these measures involve complicated technical details and are aimed at institutions (like the judiciary) that enjoy low popular trust anyway, I am not particularly optimistic about the ability and willingness of Romania's civil society and mass media to monitor the government's actions consistently and effectively.

Therefore, the role of external actors will continue to be crucial. While Western pressures were effective in limiting the damage to Romania's democratic institutions during the summer 2012 crisis,⁶ the longer-term prospects of Western pressures are more uncertain. On the one hand, EU leverage has not been completely eliminated in the post-accession countries,⁷ and in the Romanian (and Bulgarian) case the issue of joining Schengen complements the potential loss of EU funds for flouting European law. However, such sanctions have had at best mixed success in the Hungarian case and, if taken too far, could trigger a geopolitical reorientation towards Russia or China, a possibility that both Orbán and some of the more strident voices in the Romanian USL have hinted at.

Given the limitations of leverage, the importance of Europe's normative power for the future of East European democracy is likely to grow. The good news in this respect is that the process of European integration has expanded the set of linkages at both the citizen and the elite level, which can facilitate the transmission of European norms. The bad news is that even though the EU still enjoys considerably greater trust in both Romania and Hungary than national governments and parliaments (see Fig.1), this support has eroded considerably after 2008 in response to the EU institutions' less-than-stellar handling of the global economic crisis. The resulting decline in the domestic political costs of anti-EU positions is likely to weaken the effectiveness of Western criticisms, even in traditionally deferential countries like Romania.

⁶Thus, according to a public opinion survey run by the Romanian Electoral Studies project in November 2012, over 50% of respondents agreed that President Băsescu had kept his position due to EU pressures, whereas only 20% disagreed.

⁷See Philip Levitz and Grigore Pop-Eleches. "Why no backsliding? The European Union's impact on democracy and governance before and after accession." *Comparative Political Studies* 43.4 (2010): 457-485.



Another crucial precondition for the effective use of soft power, is that EU politicians need to set their partisan biases aside in judging democratic developments in other member states. The European People's Party's (EPP) failure to discipline either Berlusconi or Orbán has been mirrored by a tit-for-tat support pattern of European Liberals and Socialists for Romania's USL government, and the open squabbles that resulted have undermined the credibility of otherwise justified criticisms of the Romanian government by EPP-linked politicians like Jose Manuel Barroso and Viviane Reding.⁸ But perhaps this will be the one area where the addition of Romania to the list of "ailing" EU democracies will yield some positive results: given that the culprits for the democratic backsliding of Romania and Hungary are evenly divided among the three largest European political parties, perhaps EU politicians can figure out a non-partisan basis for addressing democratic backsliding in its member countries.

Russian Influence on Democracy in a Newly Divided Europe and Eurasia¹

Mitchell A. Orenstein
 Northeastern University

WHILE a great deal of attention has been devoted to the role of the European Union (EU) in promoting democracy in post-Communist Europe, few have considered whether Russia has contributed to failed or incomplete democratization in most of the non-Baltic former Soviet countries. Has Russia promoted authoritarian rule? Has it been effective? These questions are of growing importance as Russia seeks to found a Eurasian Union under the third Putin presidency

⁸This rallying around the European party banner contrasts with PES's prompt suspension of the Slovak Smer for its decision to enter a coalition with the extreme-nationalist Slovak National Party.

¹Adapted from David R. Cameron and Mitchell A. Orenstein, "Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in its 'Near Abroad.'" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 28:1 (January-March 2012).

as a counter-weight to the EU.

Many central, eastern, and southeastern European formerly Communist countries have created polities that are, in every respect, as democratic as those in Western Europe. But in Russia and most of the other non-Baltic states formed out of the Soviet Union after its demise in 1991, despite the existence of recurring contested elections, multiple parties and even occasional alternation of control of government, polities retain authoritarian elements. Most notably, the playing field on which elections are contested is tilted steeply in favor of the incumbents. Executive power is unchecked. Strong and independent parliaments are absent. Political rights and civil liberties are limited. Regime opponents are harassed and sometimes subject to violent repression.

In the past decade, Europe and Eurasia have diverged sharply, raising the specter of a newly divided continent. While Western Balkan countries democratized significantly after the wars of the 1990s, most of the non-Baltic post-Soviet countries have experienced an erosion of rights, liberties and democracy over the past decade. Notwithstanding the optimism about possible democratization generated by the "Color Revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in 2003-05, since the late 1990s most of the non-Baltic post-Soviet states have become less democratic, and their citizens have suffered a diminution of their already-limited rights and liberties.

Russia has seen the sharpest deterioration of all. While the Preamble of the Russian constitution speaks of "reviving the sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting the firmness of its democratic basis" and Article 1 declares it to be "a democratic federative law-governed state with a republican form of government," the Russian polity is hardly democratic. Its recurring presidential and parliamentary elections, multiple parties, and zone of tolerated political contestation and opposition clearly differentiate it from unambiguously authoritarian regimes. But those electoral elements do not make it a democratic polity. According to Freedom House data, the erosion of rights and liberties began in 1991—the last year of the Soviet Union. After 1991, the measure of rights and liberties has moved downward in a series of steps, first in 1992, then in 1998-2000, then in 2004. Over the past 20 years, there has not been a single year in which the Freedom House composite measure of rights and liberties in Russia increased.

To what extent has the deterioration of rights and freedoms in Russia affected other non-Baltic former Soviet countries? While some countries, notably in Central Asia, have lacked democracy all along, other former Soviet countries may have been influenced by Russia's stepwise move away from democracy. In particular, Russian influence may be greatest in other hybrid regimes in the European parts of the former Soviet Union, where Russia competes for influence with the EU.

Only a few former Soviet countries have followed Russia's pattern of liberalization in the early 1990s, with deterioration of rights and freedoms thereafter. Armenia and Belarus have mirrored Russian trends in this way. Yet other countries moved in an authoritarian direction before Russia—for instance in the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. It is not obvious that Russia needed to exert any leverage to thwart democratic ambitions in most of those states; the national leaders did that themselves—and, indeed, in most instances did so before the Russian leaders did.

Russian influence may be most apparent in those hybrid regimes that lie between Russia and the EU. Ukraine and Moldova, for instance, appear to be caught between Russia and the EU and provide evidence both for and against Russian influence. Both countries have enjoyed more extensive and more secure rights and liberties over the past decade than Russia, although the extent of rights and liberties has fluctuated. For a period of six years in the late 1990s and early 2000s,

while Ukraine was controlled by President Leonid Kuchma, the situation with respect to rights and liberties was better in Moldova than in Ukraine. But after the 2004 Orange Revolution and the disputed but eventual election of Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine experienced a significant improvement in rights and liberties. However, after Viktor Yanukovich was elected president, there was some erosion in the extent and security of rights and liberties.

In contrast, the extent of rights and liberties in Moldova decreased over the eight years in which Vladimir Voronin, the leader of the Communist Party, held the presidency. But after that party lost the parliamentary elections of July 2009 and a new, pro-European government was formed by the opposition parties, the downward trend was reversed and rights and liberties increased in 2009 and 2010.

While Freedom House data does not provide clear evidence that Russia's increasingly authoritarian government has been the main force for authoritarian rule in other former Soviet countries, linkage with the European Union has been highly correlated with democratization in the former Communist states. Countries which are located close to western Europe and developed extensive trade ties as well as formal membership-oriented relations with the EU in the early post-Communist years were much more likely to consolidate democratic rule. Conversely, the propensity to retain authoritarian or, at best, hybrid polities in the post-Communist era appears to have depended, at least in part, on the greater distance of a country from the West.

Russian influence may have helped to prevent those countries that experienced color revolutions from taking further steps towards the West, including governance changes that would expand rights and liberties. This influence could have taken any number of modes and mechanisms. However, three types of linkage seem most consequential, in terms of providing Russia with leverage vis-à-vis the other states. They are cultural linkages—specifically, the presence of significant numbers of persons of Russian heritage in several states; economic linkages—specifically, the linkages created by high levels of trade openness, interdependence, and energy dependence; and international institutional linkages—specifically, the linkages created by shared membership in international security and economic organizations.

Over the past decade, Russia has launched new security and economic organizations that link some but not all of the post-Soviet states with Russia, most notably the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Simultaneously, other post-Soviet states have developed linkages with international organizations in which Russia is not a member, such as the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. This suggests a growing differentiation within the post-Soviet space between Russia and the states aligned with it in the new security and economic organizations and the states that are aligned with each other in alternative international institutions. Ironically, it is the latter group that is most likely to be subjected to Russian influence that, intentionally or otherwise, contributes to an erosion of rights, liberties and democracy.

Whatever the causes, Europe and Eurasia are in danger of being newly divided into a camp centered around the European Union that practices democracy and a competing camp centered around Russia where rights and liberties are failing to take hold. Further research is required to understand the causes of this trend, which confronts Europe with a surprising new security, economic, and human rights dilemma.

Democracy, Reform and EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Can We Hope for Sanaderization?

Milada Vachudova

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

As we near the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the European Union (EU) enlargement process continues with the states of the Western Balkans: Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. Kosovo waits in the wings. Over the next two decades enlargement will continue, but slowly. Each of the candidates and proto-candidates that remains in the EU's official membership queue has its own unique political circumstances and challenges. While the variation in domestic conditions is great, the main roadblock to progress is the same: entrenched elites for whom high quality institutional and economic reforms are costly. For this reason it is wise to treat arguments that blame the EU for the region's problems with skepticism, even if in myriad ways Western and EU policy toward the region could have been better. In this short article I sketch the situation of the most advanced candidate, Croatia; the largest and most ambiguous candidate, Serbia; and the least promising and most frustrating candidate, Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Croatia charts a relatively hopeful course for the Western Balkans. It has succeeded in meeting the EU's accession requirements and is slated to join the EU in 2013 after an overhaul of state institutions and strengthening of the rule of law. There are still many problems in Croatia, including high levels of organized crime and the absence of efforts to encourage refugee return among Croatia's erstwhile Serbian minority. Celebrations attending the recent verdict of the ICTY freeing former general Ante Gotovina on appeal showcased the dark side of Croatian nationalism, and Croatia must now be judged on how it pursues war crimes trials at the domestic level. A cynic can look at Croatia and say that it is simply the beneficiary of relative economic prosperity and of ethnic cleansing that removed the Serbian minority in 1995. But, paradoxically, the removal of the Serbs forced nationalist politicians in Croatia to tend to domestic reform in response to the expectations of their voters for a rising standard of living and a more efficient state.

Yet there is more to the story. Croatia's political party system experienced a dramatic change after 2000, not just with the ousting of the vicious authoritarian regime of Franjo Tudjman but also, crucially, with the transformation of the agenda (if not the membership) of his extreme right-wing Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party. As my model of party behavior in the EU accession queue would predict, the HDZ embraced democratic reforms and preparations for EU membership.¹ This was perhaps easier than in neighboring Serbia because Croatia's belonging to Western Europe had never been questioned by the HDZ² and because the destructive grip of authoritarian forces was somewhat weaker.³ After the HDZ recaptured power at the end of 2003, Prime Minister Ivo Sanader led a government that put preparations for EU membership at the heart of its governing program, and that included reforming the judiciary and bolstering institutions to fight corruption.⁴ What Sanader did not apparently consider, however, was that these stronger and more independent institutions might go after him. He was indicted on a colorful array of

¹Milada Anna Vachudova, "Tempered by the EU? Political parties and party systems before and after accession," *Journal of European Public Policy* (2008) 15, 6: 861-879.

²Jelena Subotic, "Europe is a State of Mind: Identity and Europeanization in the Balkans," *International Studies Quarterly* (2010) 55, 2: 309-330.

³Danijela Dolenc, *Democratic Institutions and Authoritarian Rule in Southeast Europe*, ECPR Press, 2013.

⁴Andrew Konitzer, "Speaking European: Conditionality, Public Attitudes and Pro-European Party Rhetoric in the Western Balkans," *Europe-Asia Studies* (2011) 63, 10: 1853-1888.

corruption charges and was sentenced to ten years in prison by a Croatian court in November 2012.

What we need, therefore, is the "Sanaderization" of the other Balkan states (Greece, too). From his jail cell, Sanader symbolizes the possibility that leaders of authoritarian parties will respond to EU incentives and domestic pressures, moderating party agendas in order to stay in the political game.⁵ He also symbolizes the hope that these leaders will profoundly reform state institutions and then, if warranted, these institutions will send them straight to jail for their past and current crimes. But this sequence of events is now less likely as entrenched and immensely corrupt political leaders in the region, not wishing to join Sanader behind bars, come to see EU-led institutional reform with much greater caution.⁶

Whether Serbia is making progress at improving the quality of its government and institutional reform at the start of 2013 is difficult to judge. Following in the footsteps of Croatia, the axis of competition in Serbia has shifted quite dramatically over the last decade.⁷ The powerful extreme right-wing Radical Party split in 2008, with Tomislav Nikolić bringing many party members into his new Progressive Party. Nikolić proclaimed that it was his support for Serbia's integration into the EU that forced a split from the Radical Party loyal to war criminal Vojislav Šešelj. Meanwhile, the Socialist Party of Serbia, the party of Slobodan Milošević, has also moved toward reform and adopted an agenda supporting Serbia's membership in the EU under its new leader, Ivica Dačić. After the May 2012 parliamentary elections, the Progressive Party and the Socialist Party formed a coalition and Dačić became prime minister, marking a return of Milošević's former allies.⁸

Even though Europe's economic crisis had hit Serbia especially hard and the Democratic Party (DS) government in power since 2008 had little to show for its tenure in power, its leader Boris Tadić was widely expected to win the May 2012 presidential elections. Tadić and the DS had long presented themselves at home and abroad as the only hope for a reasonable, pro-Western, pro-EU government for Serbia. With extremists opposing them at every turn, they counseled the EU and the US to expect only modest gains—and then, bit by bit, delivered these gains in highly significant foreign policy areas such as cooperation with the ICTY, remembrance in Srebrenica, and the regulation of relations with neighboring Kosovo. What they did not deliver, however, was domestic reform. Instead, changes to the judiciary filled it with DS acolytes; party control and the sale of jobs in the public sector only increased; the media became less independent; the oligarchs still acted with impunity; and there was little progress in improving Serbia's business environment for small and medium enterprises. Nikolić defeated Tadić in the second round of the presidential elections not because more Serbs embraced the nationalist rhetoric of Nikolić, but because many supporters of Tadić and the DS were so disappointed that they could not bring themselves to vote at all. Some former DS supporters even voted for Nikolić on the logic that the tempering effect of government could be beneficial for the Progressives, Serbia's largest political

⁵Milada Anna Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism*. Oxford University Press, 2005.

⁶Thanks to Kristof Bender, Florian Bieber and other participants at the conference "Leaving Europe's Waiting Room. Overcoming the Crisis of EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans," at the University of Graz in November 2012 for a great discussion on this point. For more information on Croatia, see the website of the European Stability Initiative (www.esiweb.org) that includes the documentary film "Twilight of Heroes: Croatia, Europe and the International Tribunal."

⁷Danijela Dolenc, *Democratic Institutions and Authoritarian Rule in Southeast Europe*.

⁸On Serbia's new government, see this and other posts tagged 'Serbian politics' by Tim Judah on the Eastern Approaches blog of the Economist: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/07/serbian-politics>

party, and that alternating out of power could be beneficial for the DS. After six months, there is some evidence that this could be true: The new leader of the Progressive Party, Alexander Vučić, has had the most powerful tycoon in Serbia arrested on corruption charges, and negotiations on Kosovo continue apace. All together, political developments in Serbia in 2012 and 2013 have been nothing short of dramatic—but the transfer of power has been orderly and peaceful.

The missing piece in Serbia, however, is concerted pressure for reform on the part of voters, civil society and interest groups.⁹ Without this kind of systematic pressure, the Vučić / Dačić government may prosecute tycoons and make slow progress on Kosovo even as they build up their own corruption rackets. The EU does have substantial leverage over Serbia—and it is this leverage that explains Serbia's cooperation on the Kosovo issue. But as the EU and especially German leaders continuously prioritize the resolution of the Kosovo issue, they fail to apply sufficient pressure on the Serbian government to pursue high-quality domestic reforms. Western leaders and Serbian citizens should understand that it is in this way the Kosovo issue undermines the strength of the Serbian state.

As hard as it is to imagine Serbia's current government of Progressives and Socialists bringing positive change, looking back at 20 years of post-communist transition we see that sometimes the formerly authoritarian parties do enact the most difficult and sweeping reforms. We can cling to no such glimmer of hope when it comes to Bosnia. The engagement of citizens and interest groups in politics, so important in helping to improve performance and accountability, is even weaker than in Serbia. Consequently, the costs for politicians of not complying with EU requirements are even lower.¹⁰ Bosnia's unwieldy, even grotesque institutions create such terrible incentives for politicians at myriad levels of government that it is hard to see how citizens or civil society groups can ever break through. Politics in Bosnia has been reduced to backroom deals between the leaders of the six main political parties—and these parties have been transformed into rigid, authoritarian structures that doggedly pursue personal and party agendas at great cost to the citizens. Sadly, whenever the EU and the US have placed their hopes in a new, less nationalist political leader in Bosnia, be it the Bosnian Serb leader of the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) Milorad Dodik or the Bosniak leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) Zlatko Lagumdžija, they have subsequently become more nationalist, less moderate and more anti-democratic.

As the EU's enlargement process soldiers on in the Western Balkans, it is useful to ask whether it is succeeding. There is no question that the enlargement process has suffered as a result of the economic crisis, with European governments distracted and under the stress of economic austerity, and with Western Balkan governments and citizens coping¹¹ with a deep and lasting recession that has brought hopelessness and hardship to many. Some have argued that the EU has used its leverage poorly vis-à-vis the Western Balkan states, and that its mistakes have pushed these countries away from reform. Some even suggest that the EU has purposefully mismanaged its enlargement tools to stop enlargement as it suffers from enlargement fatigue and economic crisis. But on the ground the evidence all points to a process that continues, slowly, doggedly, hampered

⁹On variation in post-communist Europe, see Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua Tucker, "Communism's Shadow: Postcommunist Legacies, Values, and Behavior," *Comparative Politics* (2011) 43, 4: 379-408; Besir Ceka, "The Perils of Political Competition: Explaining Participation and Trust in Political Parties in Eastern Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* (forthcoming; available online).

¹⁰Vedran Džihic and Angela Wieser, "Incentives for Democratisation? Effects of EU Conditionality on Democracy in Bosnia & Hercegovina," *Europe-Asia Studies* (2011) 63, 10: 1803-1825.

¹¹Dimitar Bechev, "The Periphery of the Periphery: The Western Balkans and the Euro Crisis," European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, August 2012.

by local elites and not by Western indifference. Indeed, an EU that was looking to head off enlargement would make an unholy bargain with corrupt Western Balkan elites, eager to avoid the "Sanaderization" of their country: The EU would offer them only second class membership, and in return it would not require far-reaching institutional reforms. So far, however, this is definitely not on the table.¹²

The halting nature of political and economic reform in the Western Balkan candidates is caused by very difficult domestic conditions—and the prevalence of political and economic elites that are more than satisfied with the domestic status quo. The interesting question now whether a greater, sustained investment in EU leverage can displace these elites—or force them to change the status quo. Change has proven especially difficult when matters of national sovereignty and territory are intertwined with the domestic sources of power of entrenched elites.¹³ This is what did change in Croatia, and could still change in Serbia if Kosovo fades from the national agenda. What happens next in Serbia will tell us a great deal about the durability of the EU's leverage on political party agendas and how they translate into policy for governing parties. Another barometer for the effectiveness of EU leverage and the EU's commitment to ongoing enlargement is Montenegro. Very small and quite rich, Montenegro was given the green light by EU leaders to start negotiations in 2012. But for these negotiations to conclude successfully, Montenegro's state institutions, especially the judiciary, will need a thorough overhaul that includes dramatic improvements in the fight against corruption and organized crime. The puzzle in Montenegro is whether these far-reaching reforms can actually be considered successful without putting Prime Minister Milo Đukanović and his associates, who have benefited from colossal rent-seeking for over 20 years and whose links to organized crime are well known, behind bars.

We have good evidence that, as a rule, reforms in post-communist states suffer little backsliding after membership in the EU is achieved.¹⁴ This is only meaningful, however, if reforms are adequate at the moment of accession! The EU has had only limited success in ramping up the fight against corruption in Bulgaria and Romania since they became members; the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) has proved a valuable tool, but everyone agrees that pre-accession leverage is more powerful.¹⁵ And then there is Hungary: the recent success of Viktor Orbán and his FIDESZ party government in severely damaging liberal democracy has saddened observers and put the EU on its guard. Consequently, the EU acted quickly to check the authoritarian tampering of Victor Ponta and his Social Democratic Party (PSD) government in Romania last summer. It is clear that the EU must press hard for the Sanaderization of Montenegro and the other Western Balkan candidates, even as it faces economic crisis and an unsettled period for European integration at home.

¹²For the proposal in a Serbian newspaper in December 2012 that Serbia walk away from the prospect of EU membership and instead join the European Economic Area, and for Florian Bieber's (withering) response, see Bieber's blog: <http://fbieber.wordpress.com/2013/02/04/the-debate-continues-serbia-eu-or-eea/>

¹³Gergana Noutcheva, *European Foreign Policy and the Challenges of Balkan Accession: Conditionality, legitimacy and compliance*, Routledge, 2012; Florian Bieber, "Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU membership in the Western Balkans," *Europe-Asia Studies* 63,10 (2011), 1783-1802.

¹⁴Antoaneta Dimitrova, "The New Member States of the EU in the Aftermath of Enlargement: Do New European Rules Remain Empty Shells?" *Journal of European Public Policy* (2010) 17,1, 137-148; Philip Levitz and Grigore Pop-Eleches, "Why no backsliding? The European Union's impact on democracy and governance before and after accession," *Comparative Political Studies* (2010) 43, 4: 457-485; Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Europeanisation after Accession: Leaders, Laggards, and Lock-In," *West European Politics* (2012) 35, 1: 20-38.

¹⁵Aneta Spendzharova and Milada Anna Vachudova, "Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy After EU Accession," *West European Politics* (2012) 35, 1: 39-58; Venelin Ganev, "Post-Accession Hooliganism: Democratic Governance in Bulgaria and Romania After 2007," *East European Politics & Societies* (2013) 27, 1: 26-44.

Poland: Illiberal Temptation Rejected (so far)¹

Jan Kubik

Rutgers University

POLAND is by all accounts one of the most successful cases of post-communist/post-authoritarian transformations. It is also an interesting case as it has at least three unique features: (1) it was the country with the most massive popular challenge to state socialism (Solidarity), (2) it was a pioneer in initiating the democratization in the Soviet bloc, and (3) it introduced the earliest and most radical neo-liberal economic reforms (January 1990). With such a background and a considerable portion of the population negatively impacted by the post-communist transformations, the country is a convenient place to study the political vagaries of illiberalism and authoritarianism.

Although Polish illiberalism has been strong particularly since the mid-2000s, it has not found a sufficiently strong political vehicle to derail liberal democracy.² The illiberal parties of consequence over the last two decades have included: the League of Polish Families (LPR), Self-Defense, and the Law and Justice Party (PiS). The coalition of these three parties ruled Poland between 2005 and 2007. As this coalition disintegrated, the elections of 2007 were won by the moderate, center-right Civic Platform (PO). PO won again in 2011. The changing composition of Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament since the fall of communism, is depicted in Figure 1.

Note the dramatic shift of power in the Sejm from the left to the right between the 2001 and 2005 elections. The Democratic Left Alliance suffered a humiliating defeat (dropping from 216 seats to 55) while PiS gained 111 seats (rising from 44 to 155 seats). PiS's success was short lived, however. Its power peaked in 2007 (166 seats) and its share of seats declined in 2011 (to 157 seats). More importantly, the parliamentary power of the moderate PO has increased systematically, from 65 seats in 2001 to 207 seats in 2011. After winning a plurality of votes in the October 2005 elections by a relatively slim margin, the PiS lost decisively in both the November 2007 and October 2011 elections. I interpret this trend as the solidification of *moderate centrism* in Polish politics and the rejection of illiberalism by a significant plurality of voters. So, illiberalism has not become a dominant force in Polish politics. It has become a fixture on the Polish political scene, however, with considerable consequences for the tenor of Polish politics.


Let's examine illiberalism of the major right-wing political party, PiS. Populism is the cornerstone of the party's program. Its politicians not only frequently challenge the legitimacy of the specific institutions of representative democracy, for a time they also vigorously championed a comprehensive ideology delegitimizing the whole post-communist political order.³

¹A more elaborate version of this essay appeared in *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 8 (2): 79-89.

²Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Rafal Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots* (London: Routledge, 2010).

³It is conventional to refer to the post-1989 Polish political regime as the Third Republic. PiS argued that this republic was illegitimate, mostly because of the power and influence of excommunists, and for a while advocated the formation of the Fourth Republic.

Figure 1: The Changing Composition of Sejm (Lower House of the Polish Parliament), 1991-2011 (share of seats in percent)



Note: The graph illustrates the share of seats in Sejm (1991-2011). Only the parties that won at least 3 percent of the seats are included.

Organizational anti-pluralism is difficult to practice in a system that has instituted solid protections of indirect democracy. Poland has done so. Therefore, since the outright delegitimation of political adversaries is impossible, the main strategy is to discredit them as often and in as many venues as possible. The battleground is thus primarily cultural, although many attempts have been made to achieve control over at least some institutions, particularly in the media and public education. The main institutional success of PiS was the control it achieved over the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), whose chairman from 2005 to 2010, Janusz Kurtyka, openly proclaimed his pro-PiS orientation.

Ideological monism of PiS is apparent in its politicians' frequent discrediting of other political options as "alien" to the Polish national substance. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the party, often resorts to rhetorical strategies of innuendo to suggest that his adversaries are "traitors" or "agents." He frequently challenges their anticommunist credentials and their true "Solidarity" backgrounds. The party is staunchly nationalistic, and its leaders are prone to incite or exacerbate "collective narcissism"⁴ via rhetorical tirades directed against either Germany or Russia (or both). The picture of the world the party proposes is relatively simple and tends to be of the "black and white"

⁴Agnieszka Golec de Zavala, Aleksandra Cichočka, Roy Eidelson, and Nuwan Jayawickreme, "Collective Narcissism and Its Social Consequences," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97 (2009): 1074.

variety.

PiS, therefore, possesses all three attributes of a party whose philosophy is illiberalism (populism, organizational anti-pluralism, and ideological monism), which is promoted and practiced within the restrictions of a well-functioning democracy. Its electoral successes, however, are modest, to say the least.

Economic theories predict that the appeal of illiberalism increases when the economic situation worsens and declines when that situation improves. The relative lack of success of PiS and similar parties in Poland can be explained by the fact that the Polish economy over the last twenty years has had the best economic performance of all post-communist countries. There are, of course, categories of people—less educated, older, living in particular rural areas—whose lives have not improved since the fall of communism and often have worsened. These people tend to vote for PiS in high numbers, particularly since the party made a decisive switch toward the populist right.⁵

Political causes of a party's success fall into two categories: organizational and material. Organizationally, PiS was a well-functioning machine, at least until recently, with local and regional offices distributed throughout the whole country and particular strength in the south and east of Poland. The party has been systematically building its base since its founding by the Kaczynski twins in 1998. However, PiS has encountered problems with defections. For complex reasons, Kaczynski's dictatorial style being arguably the most important, the party recently suffered two waves of high-level defections. Some members of the earlier splinter group joined PO; the most recent defectors formed a new right-wing party (Solidarna Polska) predict. PiS is closely allied with a set of cultural institutions, among which the most prominent is the ultra-Catholic and populist Radio Maryja, which often promotes cultural parochialism and ethnic exclusivism. PiS also enjoys the support of influential sectors of the Catholic Church's hierarchy and clergy.

I do not have the full picture of the material base behind PiS's staying power. Since 2001, Polish political parties have been financed predominantly from the state budget. The amount of governmental subvention is determined by the electoral results. PiS has been profiting from its relatively large electoral support and sizeable parliamentary representation. For example, its total governmental subvention in 2008 was 35.5 million Polish *zloty* (over ten million dollars), compared to PO's almost 38 million. Cynically, one may say that while the party's strategy has not resulted in bringing it to power (with the exception of the 2005-2007 period), it does generate a stream of income that sustains its professional personnel.

Cultural explanations should have both a supply and demand side. Many studies of the demand side emphasize the *long durée* conservatism and susceptibility to illiberal visions among a sizeable sector of the Polish populace. And, it has been shown that discourses based on simple binaries tend to be more effective in resonating with people who have the heightened need for *cognitive closure* and epistemic clarity. Research in political psychology suggests that such needs are higher among the politicians and supporters of the right than of the center (the situation on the left is more complex). Agnieszka Golec de Zavala, "Cognitive Skills and Motivation to Adapt to Social Change among Polish Politicians," in *The Psychology of Politicians*, ed. Ashley Weinberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 76-96.

Analyses of the demand side need to be complemented by studies of the supply side. Only the latter can provide explanations of why climates of opinion (*Zeitgeist*) or dominant popular con-

⁵Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland*, 165-167.

victions sometimes change and sometimes do not. The answers must come from the study of deliberate framing (signifying) activities by cultural entrepreneurs via specific media and educational institutions—political parties' "propaganda" operations among them. Here, PiS has engaged in mnemonic war and has been relentless in propagating its vision of Polish post-1989 transformation as a period of wasted opportunities. In their vision, this period has its roots in the "illegitimate" deal at the Round Table that guaranteed ex-communists too much influence in the public, particularly the economic, life of the country. All other parties in Polish politics celebrate the Round Table as an unprecedented achievement that allowed Poland to enter a path of democratic transformation without violence, and PiS's aggressive strategy aimed at delegitimizing its competitors has proven largely ineffective.

Finally, let's take a quick look at two theories that, *inter alia*, propose explanations of the "right wing/populist/illiberal reaction" to rapid political and economic transformations and/or dramatic dislocations associated with globalization. The *cultural trauma theory*, proposed by Alexander et al., seems to suggest that the anti-liberal cultural backlash should have happened relatively early during the process of post-communist transformation.⁶ It did not. In Poland, and elsewhere, the parties of the illiberal/populist right did not play any major role during the early transitional period and gradually have been gaining strength and achieved power, however briefly, only in the mid-2000s—fifteen years after the commencement of transformation.

As the cultural trauma theory may not be fully convincing, its two competitors are worthy of consideration. First, there exists an under-articulated theory that focuses on the supply side of cultural politics in post-communist states. According to this theory, the rise of illiberalism is explained primarily by the entrepreneurial activities of politicians, grass-root movements, and activists who promote a worldview that *frames* the situation as unbearable and promote political programs based on this worldview.

Second, on the demand side, cultural trauma theory has a strong competitor in a theory I would call *transformational exhaustion*. Its essence is disappointment with the *elitism*⁷ of the initial period of reforms and their outcomes. This gives rise to a growing sense of exclusion that underpins the populace's thrashing around in its search for alternative interpretive frames and political solutions. As Ost observes:

Many turned to the right because the right offered them an outlet for their economic anger and a narrative to explain their economic problems that liberals, believing they held sway over workers, consistently failed to provide. In the end, workers drifted to the right because their erstwhile intellectual allies pushed them there.⁸

Ost's explanation is incomplete; it deals mostly with the *delayed demand* for new ideas or narratives. But while some intellectuals and politicians might have been guilty of "pushing," others have been hard at work at "pulling" workers (and other people) toward illiberal explanations and policy positions. A robust explanation of the 2005-2007 success of PiS and its allies, and of the PiS's

⁶Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

⁷Jacek Wasilewski, "Trudny test demokratycznego elityzmu" [A Difficult Test of Democratic Elitism], in *Legitimizacja w Polsce. Nieustający kryzys w zmieniających się warunkach* [Legitimization in Poland. A Continuous Crisis in Changing Conditions], ed. Andrzej Rycharz and Henryk Domanski (Warsaw: IFiS PAN, 2010), 33-59.

⁸David Ost, *The Defeat of Solidarity* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 36.

staying power, should come therefore from a combination of these two theoretical leads. On the demand side, it is a *delayed response* to the transformational hardships and the sense of exclusion. This seems to be the hallmark of the *second phase of democratic consolidation*. On the supply side, it is the skillful elaboration and propagation of *illiberal/populist* narratives that are, as always, directed against two adversaries: elitism and pluralism.⁹

In order to develop a robust theory of the illiberal and authoritarian challenge in post-communist Europe, we need to explain both the nature of the *delayed popular response to the tribulations of early transformations* and the *success or failure of illiberal discourses*. In the Polish case, the illiberal challenge, though serious, has been so far ineffective. It has proven to be far more effective in Hungary, where the illiberal forces not only were able to form a government but also managed to rewrite the country's constitution. We still do not have a full-fledged theory that would allow us to explain these two different outcomes.

⁹Cas Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist," *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 4 (2004): 543.

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Nomination Deadline: 1 March 2013

Website: [Click Here](#)

As previously mentioned in this newsletter, the deadline for nominations for the EPS Awards is March 1. Nominations for each award should be sent to *each* committee member. Electronic or hard copy submissions are acceptable. All available awards, as well as the members of each award committee, are as follows:

Book Award: David Stasavage (NYU), Sigrun Kahl (Yale), David Rueda (Oxford)

Article Award: Christilla Roederer-Rynning (Syddansk Univeristy), Frank Schimelfenning (ETH Zurich), Amel Ahmed (University of Mass.)

Dissertation Award: Jordan Gans-Morse (Northwestern), Jonathan Hopkin (LSE), Markus Thiel (Florida International)

Peter Mair Award: Cas Mudde (Univ of Georgia), Gabriel Goodliffe (ITAM, Mexico), Henry Farrell (GWU)

Consult the [website](#) for more details.

Reporting Europe Prize 2013

University Association for Contemporary European Studies

Nomination Deadline: 1 March 2013

Website: [Click Here](#)

The University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) invites you to nominate a piece of outstanding journalism for the Reporting Europe Prize 2013.

The Prize, now in its sixth year, honours excellence in reporting on the European Union published in the twelve-month period leading up to the nomination deadline. Any English-language print, radio, television or blog entry will be accepted.

Please visit www.reportingeurope.eu for further details and to make a nomination. Deadline for nominations: 1 March 2013

Call for Papers: Macedonia 2013: 100 Years After the Treaty of Bucharest

United Macedonian Diaspora

25 July-3 August, 2013

Skopje & Ohrid, Macedonia

University of Amsterdam

Submission Deadline: February 15, 2013

Website: [Click Here](#)

2013 marks the 100th anniversary of the completion of the Balkan Wars and the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, which divided Macedonia among Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. The conference will explore the implications the Balkan Wars and the Treaty had on Macedonians and the Macedonian identity for both domestic and regional politics, most notably, after the establishment of an independent and sovereign Republic of Macedonia.

The Annual Global Conference, organized by the United Macedonian Diaspora (UMD), the leading organization for Macedonians worldwide, based out of Washington, D.C., invites abstract submissions for its 4th Global Conference to be held in Skopje and Ohrid, Macedonia from 25 July to 3 August 2013.

Panels are organized around the following interdisciplinary themes, with more specific topics to be listed in the next couple of weeks on the [conference website](#):

- I. The Balkan Wars (1912-1913): Analysis of events and war tactics
- II. Treaty of Bucharest: Repercussions and residual effects in contemporary politics
- III. Republic of Macedonia: current affairs and challenges
- IV. Macedonian minorities: status of Macedo-

nians living in other Balkan countries

Abstracts must be submitted in English or Macedonian, and should contain the title of the research paper, the author(s) full name, name of the institution, department, position, city and country along with contact details i.e. email id and phone numbers. A short Curriculum Vita of the author should also be attached.

Abstracts should be in 12 point Times New Roman and approximately 200-250 words. Abstracts should be e-mailed to info@umdglobalconference.org.

Competitive travel scholarships are available for students both in and out of Macedonia. For eligibility and details, please e-mail info@umdglobalconference.org.

Selected Papers will be published in a special edition release by the United Macedonian Diaspora and distributed to all subscribers and contributors to the organization, and libraries throughout the world.

Call for Papers: The Law and Politics of Multi-Level Governance

A Jean Monnet Research Workshop

June 14-15, 2013
New Brunswick, New Jersey
Rutgers University

Email: european@rci.rutgers.edu
Submission Deadline: 28 February 2013

The Jean Monnet Chair at Rutgers University is pleased to invite paper proposals for a Research Workshop on the theme of "The Law and Politics of Multi-Level Governance." When the European Communities were established, the European Court of Justice was composed of a handful of judges and staff members, there was very little European law to interpret, and few national courts actively participated in the community legal system. In the decades since, the scope of European law has expanded dramatically, the Court of Justice itself has grown

into a much larger institution and the network of national courts that cooperate (and sometimes conflict) with the European Court in the interpretation and application of EU law has burgeoned. Today thousands of judges across twenty-seven member states are trained in European law, participate in EU-related judicial networks and engage with the EU courts in Luxembourg. This workshop will bring together scholars of European legal integration, multi-level governance and comparative federalism to explore the construction of this multi-level legal system and the interactions between the national and EU level courts and the governments that comprise it.

The workshop will take place on June 14-15, 2013, at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, NJ. The workshop is sponsored by the Center for European Studies and the Jean Monnet Chair at Rutgers University. The Jean Monnet program will cover the costs of travel (economy class) and accommodation for participants and will provide a modest honorarium. We ask each workshop participant to prepare a draft paper for the conference, which participants will be asked to revise into an article following the conference as part of a journal special issue.

Scholars interested in participating should submit a letter of interest, curriculum vitae, and an abstract of their proposed paper to Prof. R. Daniel Kelemen at european@rci.rutgers.edu by Feb 28, 2013.

There are a limited number of slots available. Selections will be announced in early March.

Call for Papers: GSA Annual Conference

German Studies Association

October 3-6, 2013
Denver, Colorado
Denver Marriott Tech Center

Submission Deadline: 1 September 2013
Website: [Click Here](#)

This seminar focuses its attention on Germany and the ongoing crisis in the European Union, specifically in light of Germany's prominent role in the EU and the growing role of EU policies in member states. Building on the Fulbright 2012 German Studies Seminar on Germany and the EU and a German Studies Review forum on the crisis in the EU with contributions from Fulbright participants (forthcoming in 2013), the seminar will present an interdisciplinary approach to these issues. The organizers represent literary studies, political science, and cultural studies, and expect to draw participants from these fields as well as from sociology, geography, and economics. Art historians, musicologists, historians, and linguists may be interested as well. Our goal is to develop a rich and fruitful discussion of contemporary German-European issues that intersects disciplinary perspectives and fosters continued, enriched dialog. We hope to develop an edited volume of seminar papers.

Our plan for the seminar is to alternate between social science and humanities papers to reflect the kind of interdisciplinary discussion that makes the GSA conference so stimulating. All three organizers participated in the interdisciplinary Fulbright 2012 German Studies Seminar and have additional experience managing far-ranging discussions between representatives of different fields. After their acceptance to the seminar, participants will submit papers of 25-30 pages to Ian Wilson (ian.wilson@centre.edu) by September 1, 2013, so that all the other contributors may read them before the conference begins. At the conference itself, participants will offer briefer, somewhat more informal presentations of their papers so that session may emphasize discussion. Each session will also have a moderator/commentator (one of the conveners), although Ian Wilson will serve as primary organizer and contact person for participants.

For flexibility and richness, we suggest that the seminar will draw broadly on the organizing principle laid out above but also require partic-

ipants to engage Jürgen Habermas recent work on the EU, *Zur Verfassung Europas* (2011, published in English translation as *The Crisis of the European Union* in 2012), in their presentations. Habermas' work resonates with a central concern about the development of the EU: economic issues have often taken the forefront at the cost of the development of European political or cultural identity. Habermas suggests a cosmopolitan response based partially on the essential German notion of "human dignity" as an aspect of human rights. While we do not believe that his work answers all concerns faced by the EU or is without controversy, we think that his arguments will provide a reasonably brief, contemporary, and important work to give the seminar additional cohesion. Certainly Habermas is familiar to scholars across the interdisciplinary spectrum of German Studies.

Those who wish to submit a proposal should fill out the GSA Seminar Application Form ([click here](#)) and email it to the Seminar Coordinator for this session, Suzanne Marchand at smarch1@lsu.edu. In addition to other information, the form asks for a brief statement of purpose. It should describe the participant's qualifications and planned contribution to the seminar. More information can be found at the [GSA website](#)

Call for Papers: OPAL Online Paper Series
Observatory of Parliaments after Lisbon

Submission Deadline: Ongoing
Website: [Click Here](#)

In 2012, the Observatory of Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL), a network of researchers from Cambridge University, Cologne University, Maastricht University and Sciences Po Paris, launched an online paper series devoted to publishing new research on the role of parliaments in the European Union. The OPAL online paper series is openly accessible via the OPAL website at <http://www.opal-europe.org> (under the publications tab) where papers can

also be freely downloaded. The series is open to submissions from anyone and all submissions are subject to double-blind peer review. We aim to complete the process of peer review in 4-6 weeks and papers accepted for publication are published instantly through the OPAL website. Authors maintain their own copyright and there is no problem for OPAL with subsequent publication in print elsewhere.

We look forward to receiving submissions from anyone doing research in this field of study, which is defined broadly to include not only national parliaments and the European Parliament, but also regional parliaments and the various formal and informal processes linking actors and institutions on different levels within the EU's emerging system of multilevel democracy. We welcome both empirical and theoretical contributions and there is some flexibility on the length around the limit of 7000-10.000 words. We are happy to provide informal feedback to those planning to submit a manuscript and look forward to your submissions. Our contact details are to be found on the website.

ECPR Research Sessions

European Consortium for Political Research

9-12 July, 2012

Essex, UK

University of Essex

Submission Deadline: 25 March 2013

Website: [Click Here](#)

After another successful event in Florence last year, the ECPR is pleased to announce that the 2013 Research Sessions will be held at the University of Essex.

Since the ECPR's foundation in the early 1970s, one of its key events has been its annual Research Sessions where a fixed number of cross-national groups of researchers meet over a few days to discuss the early stages of research projects. Over the years, this has led to the establishment of several long-term research

projects and resulted in many publications.

What kind of groups are the Research Sessions for?

A group may be:

- a. meeting at the earliest stage of a research project to draft a proposal for submission to a funding organisation; or
- b. more advanced in its research and planning a book proposal.

If the latter, the group is encouraged strongly to publish its results in peer-reviewed journals or in an ECPR book series, such as the ECPR/OUP Comparative Politics Series or those produced by ECPR Press.

Groups should indicate in their application whether they fall into group (a) or (b). To maintain the rigorous academic standards synonymous with the ECPR, we accept a maximum of six groups with no more than six participants in each. The prime awarding criterion is academic quality. If two groups are deemed to be of equal quality, those sponsored by ECPR standing groups will be given preference.

What is the format of the Research Sessions?

The Sessions will take place over 3-4 days: arrival in the afternoon/early evening of day one, departure in the afternoon of day three or four.

Funding covers accommodation, organisation, lunches and some of the dinners for up to six participants per group. Participants pay their own travel costs.

Who may apply?

ECPR Standing Groups that fulfil the necessary criteria (see below). The ECPR also considers applications not sponsored by Standing Groups, without prejudice. If participants judge a section or panel of General Conferences to be extraordinarily successful, its section and panel chairs are encouraged to continue their work via the Research Sessions. However, groups must follow the same procedures as any other applicant. A proposal that comes from a previ-

ous panel/section has does not have a priority advantage over other proposals.

Which criteria do you use in selecting research groups?

Academic quality is the most important factor. Other criteria include: having a good geographical spread of participants; no more than one non-ECPR participant; and excellent potential for turning the idea into a reality (based on topic, reputation of participants etc.). An excellent scientific proposal will not fail even if most of the secondary criteria are not met; however, proposals that meet all the secondary criteria flawlessly but do not score better than 'good' for scientific quality will not be considered.

What should the proposal include?

The proposal, which should be no longer than 3000 words, should specify the research question and locate it within the relevant scientific debate and theories. It should include:

- the guiding hypothesis;
- the main 'message' or the major and innovative contribution that the research group wants to make;
- methodology;
- data;
- research steps;
- milestones;
- a rough publication plan;
- a list of members.

EUSA Thirteenth Biennial Conference

European Union Studies Association

May 9-11, 2013

Baltimore, Maryland

Hyatt Regency Baltimore

Registration Open

Website: [Click Here](#)

Join EUSA members, scholars, and practitioners from around the world for our thirteenth

biennial meeting of European Union specialists in the city of Baltimore. Baltimore is centrally located, an easy commute to Washington, D.C. which is just a short drive or train ride away.

2013 Summer Research Laboratory on Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia

Russian, East European, and Eurasian Center

June 10-August 2, 2013

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Application Deadline: April 15, 2013

Website: [Click Here](#)

The Summer Research Laboratory (SRL) on Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia is open to all scholars with research interests in the Russian, East European and Eurasian region for eight weeks during the summer months from June 10 until August 2. The SRL provides scholars access to the resources of the University of Illinois Slavic collection within a flexible time frame where scholars have the opportunity to seek advice and research support from the librarians of the Slavic Reference Service (SRS).

Political Studies Association Annual International Conference

Political Studies Association

25-27 March, 2013

Cardiff, UK

Cardiff City Hall

Registration Open

Website: [Click Here](#)

The theme of the 2013 Political Studies Association Annual Conference, *The Party's Over?*, speaks to a number of senses in which assumptions and modalities that have hitherto underpinned political life, and political analysis, may no longer be sustainable.

The collapse of the developed world's dominant macro-economic growth models have brought down with them the assumptions of prosperity that underpinned the main political agendas of both right and left. What political-economic options remain viable?

The apparent inability of mainstream politics to offer solutions, beyond endless austerity, to current problems offers to contribute further to the long-term decline in the popularity and social reach of leading political parties in many states. What future is there for representative politics?

A dominant feature of political life for half a century has been European integration. As one of the most visible manifestations of that process, the Euro, now struggles for its very existence, what prospects—if any—does this project still have?

As the dominance of the 'West' over global politics is rapidly eroded, what implications do the movement of power and wealth eastwards have for global politics? And what will replace Pax Americana?

The crisis of esteem faced by much of the established news media, symbolised and crystallised by the Leveson Inquiry, has perhaps obscured a longer-term, deeper collapse of the economic basis underpinning much of the conventional news media. How will future generations be informed about politics? And what forms of politics will these media favour?

What does Political Studies have to say about these, and many other, questions that arise from a sense that, in many respects, *The Party's Over?*

International Conference of Europeanists
Council for European Studies

25-27 June, 2013

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

University of Amsterdam

Registration Open

Website: [Click Here](#)

The current economic crisis of debt, the euro and unemployment takes place in a framework of highly dynamic creative and destructive processes occurring at various levels: globalization, heightened nationalisms, continued migration, shifting cultures, rising inequality, concerns over security, climate change, sustainable development, etc.

All of these transform definitions of Europe: of its geographical boundaries; of what institutions are needed to structure and resolve issues of policy and democracy; and of how Europe can and might interact with other parts of the world, from North America to revolutionary North Africa to the new powerhouses in Asia and Latin America. The intellectual challenge of grappling with these changes in our world provides the foundations for an exciting meeting, held in one of the founding capitals of a global Europe.