Communist Legacies and Political Values and Behavior: A Theoretical Framework with an Application to Political ....

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Communism's Shadow

Postcommunist Legacies, Values, and Behavior

Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker

The way in which ordinary citizens interact with the political world has long fascinated political scientists, and in recent years a small but growing body of research has emerged that analyzes political values and behavior in postcommunist countries. As with analyses of other features of postcommunist political systems, there is by now a strong consensus that postcommunism did not simply represent a "*tabula rasa*." Thus it is important to take account of historical legacies in other countries. While legacy arguments, which try to explain why political values and behavior in former communist countries ought (or ought not) to differ from political values and behavior elsewhere, are not new, there is no common analytical framework for assessing their effects.

This article is intended as a first step toward remedying this gap. In it, we propose a theoretical framework for considering the effects of legacies on political values and behavior in postcommunist countries. This framework takes seriously Jeffrey Kopstein's warning that "the concept of legacy is especially slippery. If the weight of the past affects the present, at a minimum, it is necessary to specify which past."[1]

A brief word on terminology is in order. In this article, we examine the effects of legacies on citizens and how they relate to politics in postcommunist countries. Often these types of empirical questions are studied as "political behavior," encompassing topics such as voting, participation, and public opinion. However, attitudes toward politics are not technically a "behavior" until the individual acts on that attitude. Therefore, we distinguish "political behavior"—actions undertaken by citizens such as voting—from "political values"—attitudes held by citizens toward politics, political actors, and public policy.

Legacies: How?

There are a variety of causal paths through which the past can influence values and behavior in the present. The mechanisms discussed here are intended to be exhaustive but not exclusive. We start from a basic understanding of attitudes and behavior as involving the interaction between an individual and a political environment. We begin by distinguishing between individual-level legacies of communism and its effects on the broader postcommunist political environment. In turn, individual legacies may be

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of a demographic nature, or they may reflect the psychological repercussions of living through communism and its aftermath. With respect to the postcommunist political environment, we distinguish the objective features of formal and informal institutions from a set of contextual factors, such as economic performance and media coverage.

Individual Experiences   The most direct communist attitudinal and behavioral legacies are likely to be through the personal experiences of citizens of the former communist countries. Two obvious sources of experiences are (1) the effect of having lived under communist rule, and (2) the effect of having lived through the collapse of communism.

Consider the experience of having lived through communism and trust in political parties. It might be expected that the experience of interacting with communist parties during the communist era would cause a general distrust of political parties, which draws attention to how long an individual lived under a communist regime. This hypothesis predicts variation in levels of trust in political parties not only across countries but also across citizens within postcommunist countries. Of course, the length of exposure is not the only source of variation in the experiential legacy of communism. Arguably, the nature of one's experience with the communist regime should also matter.

Furthermore, the experience of having lived under communism can be expected to differ systematically across interwar Soviet republics and East European countries, whose communist regimes date back only to the mid–1940s. To the extent that the experience of being educated under a precommunist regime could undermine the individual-based legacy effect of having lived through communism, legacy effects might be stronger or more pronounced in the countries of the former pre-WWII Soviet Union.[2]

Similarly, having lived through the collapse of communism and its aftermath could leave a lasting effect on how individuals approach politics. Conceptually, such a *transition-based legacy* ought to differ from a *communism-based legacy* on three dimensions. First, there should be greater variation across different postcommunist countries. For example, in certain countries (such as Poland, Czech Republic, and Romania), the nature of the communist collapse should lead to a greater belief in the ability of protest to influence political developments. Second, more variation should exist across transitional "winners and losers" than across different age groups.[3] We might also expect to see different values or behavior from a "post-transition" generation.. Finally, transition-based legacy effects should exhibit a different temporal pattern than legacies from living through communism. While the latter should diminish gradually as the memory of life under communism fades into the past, an individual's impression of the transition is likely to vary much more unevenly over time.

A second set of individual-level legacies are related to the grand developmental project of communism, which arguably left behind individuals with a distinctive set of demographic characteristics. Three possible socioeconomic legacies are highlighted here. First, communism left behind societies that were significantly poorer than their West European neighbors. Second, communism produced highly literate societies with lower levels of income inequality. Finally, communism resulted in a rapid but distorted industrialization, which created pockets of industrial concentration.[4]

The demographic imprint of communism could also be realized if postcommunist countries have different concentrations of certain types of citizens (for example, a greater prevalence of highly educated but relatively poor citizens). If that is the case, then postcommunist and noncommunist citizens with similar demographic profiles could display similar patterns of behavior, but collective political outcomes could still be very different in postcommunist countries than elsewhere. Alternatively, particular demographic characteristics may have different individual behavioral implications in former communist countries due to the distinctive patterns of communist modernization efforts.

Institutional Legacies   Another way that communist-era legacies could affect political values and behavior in postcommunist countries would be if there are distinctive institutional legacies of communism, and if these institutions have a subsequent effect on political values and behavior. Consider, first, formal institutions. In some instances, there are distinctly postcommunist institutions, such as communist successor parties, which are simply not present in noncommunist countries. Alternatively, particular institutional patterns emerged in postcommunist countries, such as presidential systems in many former Soviet republics. In the latter case, it would be incumbent upon those who argue that this is a legacy effect to demonstrate that the postcommunist institutions in question are distinctly linked to communism and/or its collapse; otherwise, institutional choices should be treated as alternative explanations rather than as legacy mechanisms. There are also distinct economic institutions directly linked to economic practices under communism. Geographically diverse supply chains for industry and companies that also provide housing and healthcare are two important examples. Similarly, the effect of informal institutions inherited from the communist era, such as "protest repertoires,"[5] or the extent to which precommunist social networks were eradicated under communism,[6] can be examined.

Regardless of the type of institution, the institutional approach to legacies presupposes a very different mechanism than the individual experiential approach. For the latter, it is having experienced communism (or the transition) that drives an individual to behave in a distinctive manner. In the institutional framework, by contrast, the key factor is the presence in postcommunist countries of peculiar institutions, which are rooted in communism and shape subsequent political behavior.

It is also important to note that political values and behavior are shaped not only by objective institutional features but by the subjective process by which citizens form their views about these institutions. Since the direct exposure of most individuals to key political institutions is usually quite limited and episodic, much of the process through which citizens evaluate and react to political institutions depends on various cognitive shortcuts, which may also be shaped by the communist past. Two of the more important mediating factors are the media, which condition how citizens receive information about politics, and economic outputs, which are used as a common shortcut for judging institutions and public officials. To the extent that either the nature of the media or the state of the economy is directly related to communist-era practices, the manner in which

these factors mediate evaluations of political institutions and actors are, at least in part, communist legacies.

Legacies and Causal Pathways   Taken together, we therefore have six potential pathways by which the past in postcommunist countries could be said to influence political values and behavior in postcommunist countries: (1) the individual-level experience of living through communist rule; (2) the individual-level experience of living through the collapse of communism and the transition that followed it; (3) a changed sociodemographic landscape from years of communist rule; (4) the existence of formal institutions from the communist era that continue to exist in the postcommunist era and exert an influence on political values or behavior; (5) the existence of informal institutions from the communist era that continue to exist in the postcommunist era and exert an influence on political values or behavior; and (6) particular socioeconomic and political outcomes that serve as criteria for citizens when evaluating political institutions but are shaped by communist-era legacies.

Legacies: What?

We now consider the types of political values or behavior in postcommunist countries that might be affected by legacies of the past. This is not an exhaustive list, but instead an attempt to highlight a few particularly interesting questions for future research and identify them as examples of the types of questions one could address using the theoretical framework we have put forward in the previous section. To do so, we draw on both the existing literature and deductive reasoning.

Postcommunist Attitudes Toward Political Parties   For decades East European and Eurasian politics were thoroughly dominated by communist parties, which allowed for virtually no meaningful electoral competition. To make matters worse, the fusion of the party and state apparatuses meant that the communist party held a ubiquitous and usually hated presence in the lives of most East Europeans. With the exception of the older generation in a few interwar quasidemocracies, most citizens of the disintegrating Soviet bloc had very little if any exposure to multiparty competition. Thus, for most, the notion of political party was indelibly tied to that of the communist party, which should be expected to negatively affect popular attitudes toward political parties. As a sign of public ambivalence toward political parties, the first round of free elections in many countries featured not parties but "movements." As time went on, these movements were inevitably supplanted by actual political parties and support for these political parties was often very low.[7] Of course, an alternative proposition may be that the distrust of parties in postcommunist countries today has nothing to do with the experience of living under communist rule, but rather is a direct result of the performance of those political parties in the postcommunist era; we return to this question in much greater detail below.

Distrust in Postcommunist Institutions   While political parties are held in particularly low esteem by postcommunist citizens, public opinion surveys suggest that many other political institutions (including parliament, the government, the civil service, and the justice system) do not fare much better. Given the alienating experience of decades of communist rule,[8] this lack of trust could simply reflect the slow progress away from the ingrained legacy of distrust dating back to the communist period.[9] As time passes, these legacies should be gradually superseded by the more recent performance of postcommunist political institutions.

While the overall importance of political trust for a wide range of economic and political outcomes has been widely discussed,[10] the implications of the postcommunist trust deficit hinge on the difficult task of untangling the mechanisms through which communist legacies and postcommunist developments shape citizens' attitudes toward political leaders and institutions. To the extent that such distrust is either a gradually receding "hangover" after decades of communist rule or a short-term reaction to the challenges of the wholesale institutional transformation of East European polities and economies during much of the 1990s, the region's long-term democratic outlook may be fairly bright despite the current malaise. If, however, postcommunist disappointments have reinforced the communist-era distrust of the political sphere, then democracy in Eastern Europe may remain at best superficial and at worst uncertain.

The Tolerance Deficit   Postcommunist Eastern Europe has seen more than its share of ethnic conflict. While some conflict was arguably the inevitable fallout of the dissolution of the region's multiethnic states, it is nevertheless worth exploring to what extent the intensity and frequency of these conflicts is rooted in a peculiarly communist legacy of intolerance. While precommunist Eastern Europe was hardly a bastion of tolerance, communism arguably reinforced these problems in at least two ways. First, its imperial undertones exacerbated the frustrations of small nationhood and created new scores to be settled after the fall of communism.[11] Second, while the communist maxim, "whoever is not with us is against us," ostensibly applied to class conflict, its broader logic nevertheless lent itself to a much wider rejection of any kind of "other."

A number of studies have used survey evidence to document the widespread political intolerance in Russia and have found that this lack of tolerance is pervasive even among generally prodemocracy respondents.[12] Nor are Russians unique in their intolerance. James Gibson finds that Russians are no more intolerant than Bulgarians, Poles, and Hungarians, and East Europeans are generally less tolerant of political opponents than West Europeans and Americans.[13] Amy Katnik finds that East-Central Europeans are less tolerant than citizens from eight Western democracies.[14] Robert Rohrschneider finds that East Germans are generally less tolerant than West Germans.[15] Joseph Fletcher and Boris Sergeyev find high levels of intolerance in Kyrgyzstan.[16]

Nevertheless, the question remains whether there is a distinct legacy of communism that contributes to these higher levels of intolerance. For example, Mark Peffley and Robert Rohrschneider conclude from a seventeen-country study that political tolerance is higher in more stable democracies.[17] While this finding predicts lower tolerance in

postcommunist countries, this is not necessarily a legacy of communism per se. More-over, most research has compared tolerance levels in postcommunist countries to levels in more established democracies; little has been done to compare tolerance levels in postcommunist countries to those in other new democracies. Thus, the subject is well suited for using our framework to try to tease out how a communist-era legacy might affect tolerance in postcommunist countries.

Political and Civic Participation Deficit   Ken Jowitt has argued that the thorough dominance of political life by the Communist Party during the Soviet period produced a "ghetto political culture" characterized by widespread distrust of the political sphere.[18] With a few notable exceptions, prior to the wave of protests that eventually led to the collapse of communism, popular participation in politics had become largely involun-tary and completely formulaic.[19] Therefore, once coerced participation was essentially eliminated after the fall of communism, one might reasonably expect lower levels of political participation among postcommunist citizens. This prediction seems to be con-firmed by cross-national survey evidence indicating that former communist citizens are indeed less likely to engage in a range of political actions (including signing petitions, taking part in demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts, and occupying buildings) than citizens of established democracies or even other postauthoritarian countries.[20]

However, the mechanisms underlying these correlations have not yet been explored in sufficient detail, thereby leaving many unanswered questions. For example, scholars disagree on whether this deficit should be considered a specific communist legacy,[21] or whether it is part of a broader post-totalitarian phenomenon.[22] Another significant challenge for legacy-based explanations is to account for the significant fluctuations in postcommunist participation. How can communist-era apathy be reconciled with the remarkable spike in political mobilization from 1988–1992?[23] The fact that millions of postcommunist citizens in a variety of different countries took to the streets in the late 1980s and early 1990s (and again during the "colored revolutions" of the mid–2000s), and that the first elections of the postcommunist era routinely featured turnout rates in excess of 70–80 percent, are difficult to square with the picture of a citizenry perma-nently disengaged from the political process. Moreover, this raises interesting questions about the subsequent decline in political participation. Was it simply a return to communist-era apathy? Or did it reflect disenchantment with postcommunist developments?[24] Con-versely, could it have been a symptom of democratic learning and normalization, whereby postcommunist citizens became more discerning about when and where to expend political effort?[25]

A closely related phenomenon that can be linked to the communist-era chasm be-tween a compromised public sphere and an idealized private sphere is the postcommunist deficit in interpersonal trust and civic participation identified by cross-national survey evidence.[26] While communist regimes promoted a variety of civic organizations, partici-pation in these organizations was often mandatory and highly regulated by the state. Therefore, transition countries initially suffered from a dearth of credible civic organiza-tions, as much of the communist "civic infrastructure" was abandoned, while the

emerging alternatives faced significant economic and human resources constraints. Since civil society restrictions were more severe in communist countries than in the generally shorter and shallower authoritarian episodes in other regions,[27] this organizational perspective would predict a large initial civic participation deficit, which should gradually diminish over time as international efforts to promote civil society development produce a new generation of civic leaders and organizations.

However, a more pessimistic interpretation of this deficit focuses on the demand-side aspect of civil society participation—the pervasive distrust of the public sphere under communism could have left an attitudinal legacy that severely undermines the sort of interpersonal and institutional trust necessary for civic participation. In addition, the logic of communist shortage economies promoted the proliferation of informal friendship networks, which continued to thrive during the uncertainty of the postcommunist transition.[28] These friendship networks are much smaller and have a very different organizational logic than Western voluntary organizations, and arguably have "crowded out" the fledgling civil society. Thus, questions to examine are whether these attitudinal legacies are slowly fading (either through generational change or social learning), and whether the participation gap can be explained by communist-era atomization or by the disappointments of postcommunist civic participation experiences.

Distinctive Voting Patterns　A growing literature has shown how postcommunist voting behavior differs from the usual patterns found in other democracies. Thus, several authors have argued that in the postcommunist context the traditional left-right division is less useful than a party's relationship to the communist past.[29] However, this raises additional questions. Does this pattern exist because the communist past still provides a strong moral compass that helps voters navigate the confusing landscape of postcommunist politics? Does it reflect the fundamental divisions between transition winners and losers? Or is it simply a more informative labeling system than party platforms?[30]

Toward a Research Agenda

Ideally, we can now move toward a more unified research agenda by generating hypotheses that draw on the pathways previously discussed to answer these kinds of questions. Such an approach should elucidate the scope conditions of legacy effects by illustrating which pathways are better supported empirically for which particular political values and behavior.

Methodological Considerations　How can a communist legacy on postcommunist political values or behavior be identified empirically? One way is to explicitly measure a quantity of interest related to a particular political value or behavior in postcommunist countries, measure the same quantity of interest in other countries, and then establish whether there is significant difference between them.[31] Once a postcommunist distinction

using such an interregional comparison has been identified, the next step is to see if this distinction can be explained using one of the legacy pathways. More practically, this involves recasting the statistical analysis in a multivariate framework with a post-communist dummy variable. If there is a distinction, this dummy variable should be significant in a bivariate regression. We would then add theoretically specified legacy variables to this analysis and observe whether the postcommunist effect either decreased or disappeared. Should this occur, it would provide evidence that the legacy explanations could account for the postcommunist distinction. We might also hypothesize that the effect of a variable on some political value or behavior would differ in postcommunist countries. For this type of analysis, the key independent variable would be an interactive variable between living in a postcommunist state and the variable in question.

A second way to test for the presence of legacy effects in postcommunist countries is to leverage variation within postcommunist countries. Doing so requires attitudinal or be-havioral differences across different citizens within postcommunist countries. Thus, if the argument is that having spent a larger proportion of one's life under communist rule makes one less likely to trust political parties, then there will be substantial individual-level variation on the key independent variable within postcommunist countries. Similarly, we can think of hypotheses with variation across postcommunist countries at the country-level as well—for example, the difference between countries that were ruled by communist parties for longer (the interwar Soviet republics) and shorter (East-Central Europe) periods of time. Finally, to address potential concerns about survey question comparability in cross-national analyses of public opinion surveys, one could analyze within-country variation across regions with different exposures to communism (such as East vs. West Germany).

An Illustrative Example: Trust in Political Parties

We now present an illustrative example of our approach. We begin with the stylized fact of a "postcommunist party trust deficit": citizens in postcommunist countries trust political parties less than citizens in the rest of the world.[32] The question, then, is whether communist legacies account for this deficit. Our analysis uses individual-level survey data and country-level socioeconomic and institutional indicators to establish to what extent postcommunist deviations from general patterns of attitudes toward political parties can be explained by communist-era legacies. In this limited space we cannot explore every potential legacy mechanism discussed above. Instead, we focus our analy-sis on (1) individual experiences of communism, (2) individual demographic charac-teristics, (3) formal institutions, and (4) socioeconomic outcomes.[33]

Trust in Political Parties: Hypotheses

Turning first to the individual life experience under communism, we expect that the longer individuals have lived under communism, the more they should be affected by

its anomic legacy, and the greater their distrust of political parties. If this effect is reinforced by family socialization, we should expect a larger and more durable trust deficit in countries of the former Soviet Union, where more generations were exposed to communism than in East-Central Europe. Moreover, we should expect a declining trust deficit over the course of the transition, both because the older generation, which has lived most of its life under communism, is gradually dying off, and because the more recent transition experience should gradually overshadow the older memories.

An alternative individual-level legacy mechanism is tied to the demographic footprint of communism, characterized among other things by low inequality and widespread secondary education, along with low overall economic development. Thus, it is conceivable that postcommunist distrust toward parties is simply a symptom of the frustrations of an overeducated but relatively poor population, rather than the result of attitudinal legacies or institutional differences. If this is true, then we should expect the postcommunist deficit to diminish once we control for such developmental legacy indicators.

Turning to institutions, it is important to understand whether postcommunist political parties differ systematically from their counterparts in noncommunist countries. Indeed, trust in parties may simply be lower in postcommunist countries because political parties are doing a worse job. Since we know of no consistent cross-national and cross-temporal indicator of political party performance, we instead use indicators of institutional features of the political system that may lead to differences in party strength and responsiveness. First, it is possible that parties in new and/or weak democracies just generally engender less trust than parties in more established and better functioning democracies. Second, to the extent that the link between voters and political parties varies across different governing systems (presidential vs. parliamentary) and electoral rules (proportional vs. majoritarian systems), it seems prudent to control for these variables in our analysis. As noted earlier, whether we conceive of these institutional arrangements as a communist legacy or the results of choices made during the transition is an open question, so for now we simply include these variables as important controls.[34] Taken together, these variables will allow us to see if the postcommunist deficit can be "explained away" by institutions.

Finally, we consider how legacies may affect the more easily observable outcomes that many individuals use as shortcuts for evaluating institutional performance. One particularly salient issue during the traumatic postcommunist transition was economic performance. While the extent of the economic crisis experienced by transition countries is obviously due at least in part to the policy choices made by postcommunist governments (and is therefore partly endogenous to the quality of political parties), almost all former communist countries experienced a combination of deep recessions, high inflation, and rising unemployment during much of the 1990s, and these crises are obviously related to the distorted economies inherited from communism. Thus, it is conceivable that the postcommunist trust deficit toward political parties is simply a reflection of the extremely difficult postcommunist economic transitions.

Table 1 Summary of Hypotheses Concerning Political Party Trust Deficit in Postcommunist Countries by Mechanism

Mechanism	Hypothesis
Individual Experience: Living through Communism	- More years lived under communism → greater distrust of parties - Size of trust deficit between communist and post-communist countries declines over time
Individual/country level demographic characteristics	- Trust deficit should diminish (disappear) once we control for demographic characteristics (especially country wealth, education)
Institutions	- Trust deficit should diminish (disappear) once we control for institutions related to performance of political parties, here age and quality of democracy
Economic performance	- Trust deficit should diminish (disappear) once we control for macroeconomic indicators

Trust in Political Parties: Empirical Analysis

To test these hypotheses, we use data from three survey waves of the European and World Values Surveys (EVS/WVS) covering the time period 1989–2004. While EVS/WVS does not cover all the countries in the world, its inclusion of over eighty countries from all five continents makes it the broadest collection of cross-nationally comparable public opinion surveys. A particular advantage of EVS/WVS for this article is that postcommunist transition countries are relatively well represented in the series, with twenty-three of the twenty-eight postcommunist transition countries having at least one survey in the series.

The dependent variable is a survey question that asks respondents to indicate their confidence in political parties on a four-point scale ranging from 0 (none at all) to 3 (a great deal). Despite the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we follow the approach of Nathan Nunn and Leonard Wantchekon in using ordinary least squares (OLS) models for the main regressions in Table 2 for two reasons.[35] First, given the size and complexity of our data sets, we wanted to use the simplest models possible for estimation purposes. Second, OLS allows for much easier interpretation of regression coefficients and interaction effects. To account for the multilevel nature of the data, we report standard errors corrected for clustering on country-year. As a robustness test, we rerun all of our analyses using two additional model specifications—first, an ordered probit analysis (again clustering standard errors by country-year) and then a multilevel hierarchical model. In neither case did the result change appreciably (see Appendix Tables A1 and A2).[36] To ensure comparability of the statistical results across different models, we restricted the sample to those observations for which data were available for all the variables included in any of the models presented in Table 2.

As a first step of the analysis, in model 1 we use a simple dichotomous indicator of residence in a former communist country to test whether a postcommunist trust deficit

Table 2 Cross-national Drivers of Confidence in Political Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country-year level variables								
Ex-communist	−.129**						.019	
	(.054)						(.126)	
Ex-communist (Wave 1)		−.191	−.298**	−.333**	−.379**	−.253		
		(.119)	(.140)	(.160)	(.168)	(.177)		
Ex-communist (Wave 2)		−.086	−.237***	−.172**	−.148	−.154*		
		(.072)	(.086)	(.083)	(.091)	(.089)		
Ex-communist (Wave 3)		−.210**	−.336***	−.255***	−.205**	−.227***		
		(.088)	(.092)	(.097)	(.094)	(.085)		
Eastern Europe								−.245***
								(.064)
Pre-war Soviet Republic								−.101
								(.095)
Inequality			−.003	−.003	−.000	−.000	−.000	−.000
			(.003)	(.004)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
GDP/capita			−.084***	−.089***	−.088***	−.166***	−.176***	−.168***
			(.032)	(.033)	(.027)	(.039)	(.039)	(.037)
Inflation				−.027	−.007	.022	.031	.027
				(.025)	(.028)	(.027)	(.023)	(.023)
GDP chg.				.003***	.004***	.004***	.004***	.005***
				(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployment				−.007*	−.007**	−.005*	−.006**	−.004*
				(.004)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
PR system					−.188***	−.192***	−.177***	−.174***
					(.068)	(.065)	(.064)	(.066)
Mixed system					−.165**	−.125*	−.123**	−.129**
					(.068)	(.064)	(.059)	(.058)
Presidential system					−.185***	−.138**	−.160***	−.163***
					(.061)	(.053)	(.050)	(.054)
Semi-presid system					−.138*	−.148**	−.092	−.125*
					(.080)	(.072)	(.075)	(.071)
Democracy age						.111*	.080	.091
						(.066)	(.066)	(.064)
FH democracy						.032***	.043***	.036***
						(.011)	(.012)	(.011)
FH democracy* Postcommunist							−.030**	
							(.014)	
Wave2	−.400***	−.444***	−.436***	−.435***	−.370***	−.359***	−.333***	−.323***
	(.073)	(.103)	(.113)	(.125)	(.104)	(.109)	(.092)	(.089)
Wave3	−.353***	−.363***	−.441***	−.437***	−.384***	−.338***	−.317***	−.311***
	(.083)	(.110)	(.115)	(.123)	(.107)	(.114)	(.096)	(.091)

Table 2 Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Individual-level variables								
Age			.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***
			(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Income			.004	.004	.001	.001	.001	.002
			(.005)	(.005)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
City			−.165***	−.152***	−.127***	−.132***	−.132***	−.135***
			(.030)	(.029)	(.025)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)
Town			−.083***	−.072***	−.058***	−.060***	−.056***	−.059***
			(.029)	(.025)	(.022)	(.020)	(.020)	(.020)
Male			.015	.015	.015	.014	.015	.016
			(.011)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)
Muslim			.235***	.227***	.198***	.256***	.254***	.255***
			(.059)	(.052)	(.056)	(.049)	(.047)	(.047)
Orthodox Chr			−.041	−.018	−.023	−.015	−.039	−.007
			(.037)	(.038)	(.039)	(.040)	(.041)	(.039)
Western Chr			.043	.041	.053**	.041*	.044*	.043*
			(.031)	(.028)	(.021)	(.024)	(.023)	(.024)
Tertiary educ			.031	.016	.017	.011	.010	.007
			(.031)	(.030)	(.026)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
Secondary educ			.026	.016	.016	.014	.012	.010
			(.022)	(.021)	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)
Observations	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205
R-squared	.020	.021	.052	.057	.070	.076	.077	.077

Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

in political parties exists. This basic model, which only controls for the survey wave to capture potential temporal effects, confirms that, on average, citizens of former communist countries have less confidence in political parties than their noncommunist counterparts.

To begin analyzing the causal mechanisms underlying this deficit, model 2 includes three interaction terms between the postcommunism indicator and the three dummy variables indicating the survey wave. While temporal trends need to be interpreted with some caution because the mix of countries differs for each of the survey waves, model 2 only partially confirms the predictions of individual communist experience legacies, which would have led us to expect a declining role of postcommunist exceptionalism. Thus, the postcommunist confidence deficit appears to decline between the first and second wave but then actually widens once again during the third wave (1999–2004).

In model 3 we control for the straightforward communist developmental legacies at both the country and individual levels, but doing so actually leads to larger and more significant trust deficits than in model 2 for all three waves. This somewhat surprising finding is partially due to the fact that low inequality and widespread secondary education—two

communist developmental advantages—were associated with greater levels of confidence in parties across the entire population of the survey. Meanwhile, two of the developmental disadvantages inherited by transition countries—lower levels of GDP/capita and fewer city dwellers—should have actually contributed to greater party confidence (given that both variables had large and statistically significant negative effects), and therefore their inclusion in model 3 further widened the confidence deficit.

Model 4 adds three indicators of economic performance: inflation, economic growth, and unemployment, which capture important dimensions of the postcommunist economic crisis. The statistical results confirm that party trust suffers in countries with high inflation, weak growth, and high unemployment, but the effects were statistically significant only for the latter two variables.[37] More importantly, a comparison of the coefficients for the postcommunism indicators in models 3 and 4 suggests that the economic crises experienced by former communist countries account for a sizable portion of the confidence deficit toward political parties in both the second and third waves.[38]

Next, we tested whether the postcommunist dissatisfaction with political parties may be simply an accurate reflection of the functioning of parties in the region's fledgling party systems. First, we introduced two sets of dummy variables that capture the nature of the governing system and electoral rules across different countries. As discussed earlier, these variables are probably better conceived as controls rather than specific institutional legacies of communism. The results in model 5 confirm that institutional design matters for public confidence in political parties, which was significantly lower in presidential systems and in PR electoral systems. The size of the postcommunist deficit was reduced by the inclusion of these institutional controls (especially for the third wave), but they do not completely explain away the deficit.

Of course, institutional design tells only part of the story of how well democratic institutions, such as parties, actually function in practice. Therefore, in model 6 we introduce two institutional performance indicators—age of democracy and the respect for civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House [FH] scores).[39] As Pop-Eleches has shown, and our summary statistics confirm, one of the more enduring legacies of communism is a democracy deficit that extends beyond the first few turbulent transition years.[40] Furthermore, former communist countries had the disadvantage of having to build "democracy from scratch,"[41] and therefore the quality of their political institutions may suffer. The impact of these nondemocratic institutional legacies is confirmed by model 6: party trust is significantly higher in countries with better functioning and more established democracies. Once we account for democratic institutional legacies, the postcommunist trust deficit in the first wave is reduced by more than a third and loses statistical significance, which suggests that part of the initial distrust of postcommunist citizens reflected at least in part an accurate assessment of the nascent political parties in their respective countries. However, model 6 also indicates that actual institutional performance could not account for the postcommunist party trust deficit in the second and third waves. While it is possible that better measures of the actual functioning of political parties would yield stronger results, we found that the trust deficit in the latter two survey waves was not affected by the inclusion of other proxies of the party performance, such as

the extent of corruption and the degree of electoral volatility in the preceding parliamentary elections (see models 6 and 7 and Table A4 in the Appendix.)

In model 7 we include an interaction term between the postcommunist indicator and FH democracy. The results reveal a large and statistically significant negative interaction effect, which combined with the significant positive main effect of FH democracy suggests that greater democratic freedoms only contribute to greater trust in political parties in noncommunist countries but not in their former communist counterparts. Moreover, model 7 suggests that the postcommunist party trust deficit is much more pronounced for countries with strong civil and political rights, and in fact the deficit disappears altogether for countries in the lower freedom range. This finding is important because it illustrates the benefit of testing for causal heterogeneity across former communist and noncommunist countries.

Similarly, model 8 suggests that once we control for economic conditions and institutional variation, the postcommunist party trust deficit primarily affected citizens of East European countries, whereas for residents of prewar Soviet republics the deficit was substantively small and statistically insignificant.[42] Strikingly, this finding is the opposite of what the individual experience with communism hypothesis predicts—more years spent under communism did not breed more distrust of parties—and clearly demonstrates that the postcommunist trust deficit is not simply a function of the length and depth of a country's communist experience. Instead, this reinforces the possibility raised by our discussion of model 7, whereby the postcommunist trust deficit is driven in part by the gap between democratic freedoms and institutional performance among the region's (largely East European) democratic front runners.[43]

Whereas the findings in model 8 suggested that citizens of countries with longer communist histories do not suffer from a larger party trust deficit, to avoid an ecological fallacy in Table 3 we focus more closely on the length of individual-level communist exposure. In model 1 we introduce a cross-level interaction effect between a respondent's age and the postcommunist country dummy. Since older citizens of former communist countries had a longer exposure to the communist system, a straightforward individual experience theory would predict a negative interaction effect, that is, a greater trust deficit among older postcommunist citizens. Instead, model 1 in Table 3 reveals a moderate positive interaction effect, which suggests that while different generational dynamics are at play in postcommunist countries, they do not confirm the predictions of a simple relationship whereby longer exposure to a treatment produces a stronger legacy effect.

Since age is an imperfect proxy of communist exposure, in model 4 we restricted our sample to survey respondents from postcommunist countries and created an individual-level variable that measures the number of years a given individual lived under a communist regime.[44] If individuals indeed suffer from greater distrust of political parties as a result of their personal experiences with communism, these effects should be stronger for respondents who lived longer under communism. However, model 4 indicates that the opposite is true: even after controlling for individual- and country-level characteristics, respondents who lived longer under communism reported significantly higher party trust.

Table 3 Communist Exposure and Types of Confidence in Political Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Party Trust	Democratic Party Trust	Non-democ Party Trust	Party Trust	Democratic Party Trust	Non-democ Party Trust
Country-year level variables						
Ex-communist	−.222**	−.236	−.291**			
	(.085)	(.271)	(.139)			
Inequality	−.000	−.014**	.018***			
	(.003)	(.006)	(.004)			
GDP/capita	−.168***	−.195**	−.268***	−.029	−.273**	−.500***
	(.038)	(.080)	(.063)	(.052)	(.131)	(.114)
Inflation	.029	.032	.117***	−.019	.069	.098**
	(.023)	(.057)	(.031)	(.023)	(.067)	(.040)
GDP chg.	.004***	.004***	.006***	.005***	.006***	.005***
	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployment	−.005*	−.007	−.003	−.014***	−.010	−.005
	(.003)	(.007)	(.003)	(.004)	(.009)	(.005)
Democracy age	.113*	.020	.175**			
	(.066)	(.131)	(.084)			
FH democracy	.033***	.039*	.038*	−.005	.032	−.009
	(.011)	(.022)	(.020)	(.012)	(.024)	(.022)
PR system	−.190***	−.286**	−.113	−.116*	.251*	.186*
	(.063)	(.131)	(.103)	(.062)	(.152)	(.099)
Mixed system	−.119**	−.314**	.129	−.078	.243	.288**
	(.060)	(.132)	(.089)	(.066)	(.181)	(.118)
Presidential system	−.140***	−.307***	.068	−.054	−.012	−.095
	(.053)	(.114)	(.077)	(.059)	(.174)	(.128)
Semi-presid system	−.135*	−.421***	.093	−.014	−.046	.204**
	(.070)	(.150)	(.093)	(.075)	(.185)	(.093)
wave2	−.325***					
	(.091)					
wave3	−.318***	.013	.064			
	(.094)	(.108)	(.078)			
Cross-level interactions						
Ex-communist* Age	.001	−.003*	.004**			
	(.001)	(.002)	(.002)			
Individual-level variables						
Age	.002***	.003***	.001			
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)			
Years under Communism				.004***	.001	.005***
				(.001)	(.001)	(.002)

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Table 3 Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Party Trust	Democratic Party Trust	Non-democ Party Trust	Party Trust	Democratic Party Trust	Non-democ Party Trust
Individual-level variables						
Income	.001	.008	−.015**	.011**	.013	−.004
	(.004)	(.009)	(.006)	(.004)	(.009)	(.008)
City	−.132***	−.110**	−.157***	−.081**	−.021	−.190***
	(.024)	(.044)	(.040)	(.033)	(.048)	(.047)
Town	−.061***	−.033	−.097**	−.036*	.056	−.160***
	(.020)	(.042)	(.045)	(.020)	(.050)	(.044)
Male	.014	.097***	−.013	.017	.117***	.012
	(.010)	(.015)	(.018)	(.013)	(.023)	(.022)
Muslim	.257***	.294**	.179**	.282***	.580***	.060
	(.049)	(.120)	(.078)	(.072)	(.166)	(.115)
Orthodox Chr	−.017	−.124	−.022	−.010	−.064	−.061
	(.041)	(.098)	(.070)	(.029)	(.083)	(.075)
Western Chr	.040	.017	.022	.038	.126	.083
	(.024)	(.046)	(.036)	(.036)	(.094)	(.067)
Tertiary educ	.012	.128***	−.228***	.016	.239***	−.220***
	(.025)	(.046)	(.033)	(.029)	(.071)	(.041)
Secondary educ	.016	.070**	−.100***	.000	.126**	−.103**
	(.019)	(.033)	(.027)	(.019)	(.051)	(.041)
Sample	All countries			Ex-communist countries only		
Observations	124205	111577	111577	37477	36245	36245

Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Since we were not prepared to formulate an alternative theory about the trust-building virtues of communism, we explored the political dynamics of party trust in greater detail. One possibility was that much of this excess confidence among older citizens reflected a legacy of blind trust in the Communist Party rather than a newfound passion for democratic political institutions. To test this proposition, we created a democratic value index (based on seven survey questions that probed citizens' attitudes toward different aspects of democratic governance and its alternatives). We then used this index to create two new variables—*democratic party trust*, which captures individuals who profess high trust toward political parties while simultaneously subscribing to democratic values, and *nondemocratic trust*, which identifies party enthusiasts with weak democratic values.

The contrast between models 2 and 3 confirms the theoretical payoff of differentiating between different types of confidence in political parties.[45] Thus, the negative and statistically significant interaction effect between age and postcommunism in model 2 is much more in line with the predictions about the nondemocratic individual-level legacies of communism: among democrats, the trust deficit is much larger for older citizens than for younger ones. This suggests that, at least with respect to this "healthier" version

Table 4 Party Trust Variation between East and West Germans

	(1) Party Trust	(2) Democratic Party Trust	(3) Non-democ Party Trust
Ex-communist	−.082***	−.297***	.381**
(East Germany)	(.029)	(.086)	(.159)
Age	.001	.006**	.003
	(.001)	(.003)	(.007)
Income	.011	.006	.014
	(.008)	(.022)	(.044)
City	.005	.008	−.357
	(.041)	(.123)	(.229)
Town	.017	.065	−.118
	(.040)	(.115)	(.184)
Male	.033	.313***	.402**
	(.032)	(.090)	(.174)
Tertiary educ	.009	.193	−1.154***
	(.045)	(.128)	(.256)
Secondary educ	.022	.267**	−.480**
	(.040)	(.115)	(.209)
Observations	1929	1928	1928

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

of trust, the countries of the former Soviet bloc should experience a gradual convergence toward the levels found elsewhere through generational replacement.

By contrast, in model 3 the positive (and marginally significant) interaction effect between age and postcommunism confirms our expectation that the greater relative trust among the elderly in former communist countries was primarily driven by those who are not supporters of democracy. The conditional effects of this interaction suggest that the postcommunist deficit was significantly weaker for nondemocratic than for democratic party trust. Thus, based on the results in model 3, the nondemocratic trust deficit was only significant (at .1 two-tailed) for respondents younger than 26 years, and among respondents over 75 former communist citizens actually had an (albeit statistically insignificant) nondemocratic trust surplus. Moreover, older age was associated with greater nondemocratic party trust in former communist countries but not elsewhere. Exclusive focus on respondents from the former communist countries leads to similar conclusions. According to models 5 and 6, living longer under communism translated into a substantively and statistically significant increase in nondemocratic party trust but did not similarly affect democratic party trust.

As discussed earlier, the reunification of Germany in 1990 offers a chance to replicate our analysis in a single country. East and West Germans share a common language and culture but of course differ in their exposure to communism. Since by 1997, the year of the WVS survey analyzed here, the two countries had very similar, and in many cases

identical, political institutions, such a comparison has the additional advantage of reducing the potential omitted variable bias. While, of course, demographic and developmental differences persist between West and East Germany, arguably these are captured by individual characteristics, such as income, education, and urban residence.[46]

Model 1 confirms the existence of a significant party trust deficit among former communist citizens, but the coefficient is only about half the size of the second-wave communist deficit in model 6 of Table 2. The difference may reflect the fact that the institutional variables in model 6 do not fully capture cross-national differences in institutional performance, in which case the effect in model 1 of Table 4 may be a better measure of the individual psychological legacy of communism on political party trust.[47] Model 2 confirms the findings from Table 3, whereby communist exposure had a particularly negative effect on party trust among prodemocracy citizens. By contrast, nondemocratic party trust was actually significantly higher among East Germans.[48] Overall, the within-country variation of political party trust among East and West Germans confirms both the existence of an overall trust deficit toward political parties, and that this deficit was more pronounced among prodemocratic citizens.

Conclusion

In this article, we have developed a theoretical framework for analyzing the effect of communist legacies on postcommunist political behavior and values. In particular, we have identified a set of mechanisms through which the communist past can shape the political attitudes and actions of citizens of the former Soviet bloc. To illustrate an application of this framework, we analyzed the link between communist legacies and the trust deficit of postcommunist citizens in political parties. Beneath the surface of a rather stubborn postcommunist deficit in public confidence toward political parties— one which can be explained only partially by economic and institutional performance differences—lies a more complex mix of psychological and political developments, suggesting a more optimistic picture. Thus, it appears that citizens of former communist countries, particularly the younger generations, are starting to overcome some of their significant deficit in democratic party trust. At the same time, former communists are shedding some of their nondemocratic party trust, which is particularly prevalent among older citizens. While in the short run this decline may undermine the legitimacy of political institutions, in the long run it probably offers greater prospects for genuine democratization.

Moreover, these findings also illustrate the value of the systematic approach we have outlined for exploring the effect of communist-era legacies on contemporary political values and behavior. Rather than simply stopping at the interesting observation that there is lower trust in political parties in the former communist world than elsewhere, our focus on the actual mechanism by which communism led to decreased party trust in the postcommunist era led us to discover that the simplest explanation for this gap—that living under communism made individuals less likely to trust political parties— was not supported by the empirical data. Instead, we found that both economic conditions

and institutional arrangements play a role in explaining why trust in political parties is lower in postcommunist countries than elsewhere. Moreover, by forcing us to confront the counterintuitive finding that more years under communism led to greater trust in political parties, the approach allowed us to generate a new way of thinking about party trust—as an agglomerate of both democratic party trust and nondemocratic party trust— that leaves us with both a more nuanced understanding of party trust in postcommunist societies as well as perhaps a more optimistic assessment for the development of demo- cratic values in the region in the future.

Moving beyond party trust, future research can apply the broad framework pro- posed in this article to a wider range of questions about postcommunist political be- havior (including, but not limited to, some of the topics we briefly discussed earlier). To the extent that this is done in a systematic fashion, we stand to learn not only about the behavioral foundations of postcommunist politics but, more broadly, about the important questions of why and when the past (and the way people remember and relate to it) can have such a lasting impact on political attitudes and behavior in the present.

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31. For the moment, we set aside the question of the appropriate reference group of "other countries"; depending on the question, it could include all other countries in the world, advanced industrialized democracies, and other new democracies.

32. Table 2, Model 1.

33. We omitted two pathways—the experience of living through the transition and informal institutional legacies—due to space and data limitations.

34. Two additional variables that we would ideally like to use as proxies for party competency but have not included in the main statistical models are corruption and electoral volatility. Corruption has obviously been a salient factor in postcommunist politics and one that should have a negative effect on how citizens see political parties, and electoral volatility could leave voters less time to develop trust in particular parties. However, both suffer from methodological concerns and data limitations. Creating a corruption index that matches the World Values Surveys involves amalgamating a number of different sources. We measured corruption by an index created by the authors combining data from three sources: World Bank Governance Indicators (Control of Corruption), ICRG, and the Transparency International CPI score. Including electoral volatility as a potential explanatory variable of trust in political parties is complicated by very serious endogeneity concerns, as low trust in parties could just as easily lead to electoral volatility. Since neither of these

variables had any effect on reducing the size of the postcommunist trust deficit, we excluded them from our primary analyses, but they are included in the Appendix (see Table A4, Models 6 and 7).

35. Nathan Nunn and Leonard Wantchekon, "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa," http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1359479.

36. The Appendix is included in the online version of this article, at http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp.

37. While the three economic performance variables were moderately correlated (between .17 and .42), multicolinearity tests did not reveal significant problems, and the findings in Table 2 are not affected by dropping any of the three variables from the model specification. See the Appendix Table A4, Models 2–4.

38. Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of economic performance indicators actually widened the deficit for the first wave, since it occurred before citizens were exposed to the full impact of the postcommunist economic crisis.

39. Age of democracy is coded by the authors. Quality of democracy is the combined total of Freedom House political and civil rights scores rescaled so that higher scores mean more democracy.

40. Pop-Eleches, 2009.

41. M. Steven Fish, *Democracy From Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

42. However, it should be noted that the difference between the regression coefficients for the two subgroups of former communist countries was only weakly significant (at .11), so we do not want to overemphasize the importance of this difference.

43. We tested one obvious potential implication of this expectations-based theory by looking at whether progress toward European integration was associated with a more pronounced trust deficit, but the results were fairly modest and explained less than 10 percent of the gap between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (see Model 9 in Appendix Table A4).

44. Coding the proportion of one's life lived under communism produced similar results.

45. Since the variables are dichotomous, we use probit models here.

46. The regressions do not include religious affiliation controls because there were not enough Eastern Orthodox and Muslim respondents in the surveys to allow consistent estimation.

47. However, we need to be careful about such a comparison because East Germany probably had better functioning—and perhaps more legitimate—institutions than other communist countries.

48. Once again, we need to be careful about extrapolating from the German case because the East German *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED) arguably enjoyed greater popular trust than its counterparts elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc.

Appendix

Table A1   Comparative Summary Statistics for Main Statistical Variables

	Ex-communist Countries	Non-communist Countries	Stat Sig[a]	Notes
Country-year level variables				
Inequality	32.5	44.8	.001	Gini coefficient of income inequality Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007) and UNU-WIDER (2007)
GDP/capita (log)	1.03	1.62	.01	Log of GDP/capita (t-1)
Inflation (log)	3.12	2.34	.01	Log of inflation (t-1)
GDP chg.	.51[b]	7.47	.001	Cumulative GDP change in previous two years
Unemployment	12.16	8.90	.08	Unemployment (%) (t-1)
PR system	.43	.32	.3	PR electoral system
Mixed system	.28	.35	.65	Mixed PR-SMD electoral system
Presidential system	.34	.60	.02	
Semi-presid system	.24	.00	.001	
Democracy age	.03	.35	.001	Duration of ongoing democracy spell (1=100 years)
FH democracy	7.34	8.08	.37	Combined FH political rights and civil liberties score (reversed)
Individual level vars				
Confidence in pol. Parties	.96	1.1	.001	Based on variable E080 in WVS
Confidence in pol parties among democrats	.11	.14	.001	Based on variable E080 and index based on E114-E117 & E121-E123 in WVS
Confidence in pol parties among non-democrats	.09	.12	.001	Based on variable E080 and index based on E114-E117 & E121-E123 in WVS
Age	42.53	38.55	.001	Based on variable X003 in WVS
Income	4.52	4.53	.001	Based on variable X047 in WVS
City	.28	.48	.001	Based on variable X049 in WVS
Town	.27	.28	.001	Based on variable X049 in WVS
Male	.48	.51	.001	Based on variable X001 in WVS
Muslim	.14	.19	.001	Based on variable F025 in WVS
Orthodox Chr	.30	.01	.001	Based on variable F025 in WVS
Western Chr	.27	.53	.001	Based on variable F025 in WVS
Tertiary educ	.20	.22	.001	Based on variable X025 in WVS
Secondary educ	.51	.39	.001	Based on variable X025 in WVS

[a] Statistical significance for country level variables calculated using number of country-years (not respondents) as basis for degrees of freedom.

[b] Excludes data for one outlier (Bosnia 1998), which experienced a 149% recovery following the end of the civil war.

Table A2 Ordered Probit Results with Standard Errors Clustered by Country-Year

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country-year level variables								
Ex-communist	−.158*						.051	
	(.069)						(.162)	
Ex-communist (Wave 1)		−.216#	−.370*	−.421*	−.481*	−.314		
		(.142)	(.174)	(.202)	(.215)	(.227)		
Ex-communist (Wave 2)		−.107	−.295**	−.208*	−.176#	−.184#		
		(.093)	(.111)	(.108)	(.120)	(.117)		
Ex-communist (Wave 3)		−.259*	−.422**	−.313*	−.247#	−.275*		
		(.113)	(.120)	(.128)	(.127)	(.114)		
Eastern Europe								−.299**
								(.085)
Pre-war Soviet Republic								−.116
								(.123)
Inequality			−.005	−.003	−.001	−.001	−.001	−.001
			(.004)	(.005)	(.004)	(.004)	(.003)	(.003)
GDP/capita			−.097*	−.104*	−.104**	−.207**	−.220**	−.210**
			(.040)	(.042)	(.035)	(.050)	(.050)	(.048)
Inflation				−.038	−.012	.027	.039	.033
				(.034)	(.037)	(.036)	(.031)	(.031)
GDP chg.				.004**	.005**	.005**	.005**	.006**
				(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployment				−.009#	−.009*	−.007	−.008*	−.006#
				(.005)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
PR system					−.245**	−.251**	−.231**	−.228**
					(.090)	(.085)	(.084)	(.086)
Mixed system					−.211*	−.158#	−.155*	−.162*
					(.088)	(.082)	(.076)	(.075)
Presidential system					−.240**	−.178*	−.207**	−.210**
					(.080)	(.069)	(.065)	(.071)
Semi-presid system					−.176	−.190#	−.114	−.161#
					(.108)	(.097)	(.101)	(.096)
Democracy age						.149#	.108	.124
						(.085)	(.085)	(.083)
FH democracy						.043**	.057**	.047**
						(.015)	(.016)	(.014)
FH democracy* Postcommunist							−.041*	
							(.018)	
Wave1	−.485**	−.530**	−.541**	−.542**	−.462**	−.449**	−.416**	−.403**
	(.089)	(.127)	(.142)	(.158)	(.132)	(.139)	(.117)	(.113)
Wave2	−.433**	−.437**	−.549**	−.548**	−.484**	−.425**	−.395**	−.389**
	(.103)	(.136)	(.145)	(.156)	(.136)	(.146)	(.123)	(.117)

Table A2 Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Individual-level variables								
Age			.003**	.003**	.003**	.003**	.002**	.003**
			(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Income			.006	−.198**	−.168**	−.175**	−.175**	−.179**
			(.006)	(.037)	(.032)	(.031)	(.032)	(.031)
City			−.216**	−.192**	−.164**	−.176**	−.175**	−.177**
			(.038)	(.039)	(.033)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)
Town			−.108**	−.094**	−.076**	−.080**	−.075**	−.079**
			(.036)	(.032)	(.028)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)
Male			.016	.016	.016	.015	.016	.017
			(.014)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)
Muslim			.301**	.292**	.258**	.337**	.335**	.336**
			(.075)	(.067)	(.072)	(.062)	(.060)	(.060)
Orthodox Chr			−.053	−.022	−.028	−.017	−.049	−.006
			(.049)	(.050)	(.052)	(.053)	(.055)	(.052)
Western Chr			.061	.059	.076**	.061#	.065*	.063*
			(.040)	(.037)	(.028)	(.032)	(.030)	(.031)
Tertiary educ			.050	.030	.031	.024	.022	.019
			(.041)	(.040)	(.035)	(.033)	(.032)	(.033)
Secondary educ			.040	.026	.027	.024	.022	.018
			(.029)	(.028)	(.026)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
Observations	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205

Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A3 Results Using Linear Hierarchical Models with Random Coefficients Estimated in HLM 6.0

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country-year level variables								
Ex-communist	−.123**						−.018	
	(.050)						(.120)	
Ex-communist (Wave 1)		−.161	−.341**	−.397**	−.432***	−.353**		
		(.119)	(.142)	(.160)	(.166)	(.166)		
Ex-communist (Wave 2)		−.086	−.243***	−.170**	−.188**	−.196**		
		(.067)	(.082)	(.075)	(.083)	(.082)		
Ex-communist (Wave 3)		−.194**	−.330***	−.231***	−.223**	−.245***		
		(.090)	(.095)	(.083)	(.093)	(.089)		
Eastern Europe								−.295***
								(.068)
Pre-war Soviet Republic								−.125
								(.098)
Inequality			−.008**	−.007**	−.004	−.004*	−.004*	−.004*
			(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)
GDP/capita			−.091***	−.095***	−.091***	−.164***	−.181***	−.171***
			(.032)	(.033)	(.027)	(.039)	(.038)	(.037)
Inflation				−.027	.004	.020	.037	.037
				(.026)	(.027)	(.027)	(.023)	(.023)
GDP chg.				.003***	.004***	.004***	.004***	.005***
				(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployment				−.008***	−.009***	−.007**	−.008***	−.006**
				(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
PR system					−.190***	−.181***	−.171***	−.168***
					(.067)	(.064)	(.062)	(.061)
Mixed system					−.147**	−.106*	−.095	−.105*
					(.069)	(.064)	(.059)	(.058)
Presidential system					−.187***	−.155***	−.185***	−.196***
					(.061)	(.057)	(.055)	(.060)
Semi-presid system					−.096	−.099	−.040	−.083
					(.074)	(.069)	(.071)	(.066)
Democracy age						.112	.078	.095
						(.072)	(.074)	(.072)
FH democracy						.022*	.037***	.028***
						(.012)	(.012)	(.011)
FH democracy* Postcommunist							−.033**	
							(.014)	
Wave2	−.338***	−.376***	−.348***	−.349***	−.278**	−.282***	−.228***	−.213***
	(.067)	(.109)	(.112)	(.120)	(.110)	(.103)	(.081)	(.081)

Table A3   Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country-year level variables								
Wave3	−.296***	−.302***	−.323***	−.316***	−.259**	−.234**	−.178**	−.166**
	(.079)	(.116)	(.112)	(.118)	(.110)	(.107)	(.086)	(.083)
Individual level variables								
Age			.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***
			(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Income			.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
			(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
City			−.086***	−.086***	−.086***	−.086***	−.086***	−.086***
			(.017)	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)
Town			−.044***	−.044***	−.043***	−.043***	−.043***	−.043***
			(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)
Male			.015	.015	.015	.015	.015	.015
			(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)
Muslim			.132***	.132***	.132***	.132***	.132***	.132***
			(.030)	(.030)	(.030)	(.030)	(.029)	(.029)
Orthodox Chr			.006	.006	.006	.006	.005	.006
			(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)
Western Chr			.058***	.058***	.058***	.058***	.058***	.058***
			(.015)	(.015)	(.014)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)
Tertiary educ			−.008	−.008	−.008	−.008	−.008	−.008
			(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)
Secondary educ			−.019*	−.019*	−.019*	−.019*	−.019*	−.019*
			(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)
Observations	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205
R-squared	.020	.021	.052	.057	.070	.076	.077	.077

Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A4 Additional Robustness Tests

Description	(1) Model 4 Table 2	(2) Drop Inflation	(3) Drop GDP chg	(4) Drop Unempl	(5) Model 6 Table 2	(6) Add Corruption Index	(7) Add Electoral Volatility	(8) Model 8 Table 2	(9) Add EU Candidate Indicator
Ex-communist (Wave 1)	−.333**	−.311*	−.358**	−.278*	−.253	−.253			
	(.160)	(.159)	(.158)	(.142)	(.177)	(.177)			
Ex-communist (Wave 2)	−.172**	−.202**	−.168*	−.212**	−.154*	−.154*	−.249**		
	(.083)	(.081)	(.085)	(.088)	(.089)	(.090)	(.102)		
Ex-communist (Wave 3)	−.255***	−.263***	−.283***	−.341***	−.227***	−.227***	−.240**		
	(.097)	(.097)	(.104)	(.091)	(.085)	(.085)	(.110)		
Eastern Europe								−.245***	−.233***
								(.064)	(.066)
Pre-war Soviet Republic								−.101	−.097
								(.095)	(.095)
Inequality	−.003	−.003	−.003	−.003	−.000	−.000	−.005	−.000	−.000
	(.004)	(.004)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.004)	(.003)	(.003)
GDP/capita	−.089***	−.080***	−.099***	−.091***	−.166***	−.166***	−.165***	−.168***	−.168***
	(.033)	(.030)	(.033)	(.034)	(.039)	(.049)	(.047)	(.037)	(.037)
Inflation	−.027		−.048*	−.021	.022	.022	.045	.027	.027
	(.025)		(.025)	(.027)	(.027)	(.028)	(.042)	(.023)	(.023)
GDP chg.	.003***	.004***		.002***	.004***	.004***	.002	.005***	.005***
	(.001)	(.001)		(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployment	−.007	−.006	−.004		−.005	−.005	−.003	−.004*	−.005*
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)		(.003)	(.003)	(.005)	(.003)	(.003)
Corruption index						.000			
						(.059)			
Electoral volatility							−.000		
							(.001)		
EU candidate									−.077
									(.064)
PR system					.111*	.111*	.085	.091	.089
					(.066)	(.065)	(.070)	(.064)	(.065)
Mixed system					.032***	.032***	.040**	.036***	.036***
					(.011)	(.011)	(.016)	(.011)	(.011)
Presidential system					−.192***	−.192***	−.183**	−.174***	−.175***
					(.065)	(.065)	(.081)	(.066)	(.066)
Semi-presid system					−.125*	−.125*	−.098	−.129**	−.129**
					(.064)	(.066)	(.088)	(.058)	(.058)
Democracy age					−.138**	−.137***	−.077	−.163***	−.164***
					(.053)	(.052)	(.060)	(.054)	(.054)
FH democracy					−.148**	−.148**	−.067	−.125*	−.137*
					(.072)	(.073)	(.085)	(.071)	(.074)
Wave2	−.435***	−.431***	−.446***	−.424***	−.359***	−.359***	−.259***	−.323***	−.318***
	(.125)	(.127)	(.117)	(.113)	(.109)	(.109)	(.086)	(.089)	(.091)
Wave3	−.437***	−.419***	−.469***	−.438***	−.338***	−.338***	−.236**	−.311***	−.306***
	(.123)	(.126)	(.117)	(.112)	(.114)	(.114)	(.096)	(.091)	(.093)
Age	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)

Table A4   Continued

Description	(1) Model 4 Table 2	(2) Drop Inflation	(3) Drop GDP chg	(4) Drop Unempl	(5) Model 6 Table 2	(6) Add Corruption Index	(7) Add Electoral Volatility	(8) Model 8 Table 2	(9) Add EU Candidate Indicator
Income	.004	.004	.004	.004	.001	.001	.006	.002	.002
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
City	−.152***	−.157***	−.152***	−.162***	−.132***	−.132***	−.129***	−.135***	−.133***
	(.029)	(.029)	(.030)	(.030)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)
Town	−.072***	−.076***	−.071***	−.085***	−.060***	−.060***	−.065***	−.059***	−.057***
	(.025)	(.026)	(.026)	(.027)	(.020)	(.021)	(.022)	(.020)	(.020)
Male	.015	.015	.016	.013	.014	.014	.016	.016	.016
	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.011)	(.010)	(.010)
Muslim	.227***	.228***	.230***	.232***	.256***	.256***	.152***	.255***	.253***
	(.052)	(.054)	(.053)	(.058)	(.049)	(.049)	(.040)	(.047)	(.047)
Orthodox Chr	−.018	−.026	−.025	−.016	−.015	−.015	−.013	−.007	−.013
	(.038)	(.036)	(.041)	(.040)	(.040)	(.040)	(.057)	(.039)	(.040)
Western Chr	.041	.040	.044	.040	.041*	.041*	.038	.043*	.044*
	(.028)	(.029)	(.030)	(.030)	(.024)	(.024)	(.026)	(.024)	(.024)
Tertiary educ	.016	.020	.019	.029	.011	.011	.000	.007	.006
	(.030)	(.029)	(.031)	(.033)	(.025)	(.024)	(.028)	(.025)	(.025)
Secondary educ	.016	.018	.019	.024	.014	.014	−.007	.010	.009
	(.021)	(.021)	(.022)	(.023)	(.019)	(.019)	(.020)	(.019)	(.019)
Observations	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	124205	86930	124205	124205
R-squared	.057	.057	.054	.055	.076	.076	.047	.077	.077

 Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A5   Countries and Years of WVS Surveys Used in the Analysis in this Article

Country	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3
Albania	1998	2002	
Algeria	2002		
Argentina	1995	1999	
Armenia	1997		
Australia	1995		
Azerbaijan	1997		
Bangladesh	1996	2002	
Belarus	1990	1996	2000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1998	2001	
Brazil	1997		
Bulgaria	1997		
Canada	2000		
Chile	1990	1996	2000
Colombia	1997	1998	
Croatia	1996		
Czech Republic	1990	1998	
Egypt	2000		
El Salvador	1999		
Estonia	1996		
Finland	1996		
Georgia	1996		
Germany	1997		
Hungary	1998		
India	1990	1995	2001
Indonesia	2001		
Iran, Islamic Rep.	2000		
Japan	1990	1995	2000
Jordan	2001		
Korea, Rep.	1996	2001	
Kyrgyz Republic	2003		
Latvia	1996		
Lithuania	1997		
Macedonia, FYR	1998	2001	
Mexico	1990	1996	2000
Moldova	1996	2002	
Morocco	2001		
New Zealand	1998		
Nigeria	1990	1995	2000
Norway	1996		
Pakistan	1997	2001	
Peru	1996	2001	
Philippines	1996	2001	
Poland	1997		

Table A5   Continued

Country	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3
Romania	1998		
Russian Federation	1990	1995	
Serbia and Montenegro	1996	2001	
Slovak Republic	1990	1998	
Slovenia	1995		
South Africa	1990	1996	2001
Spain	1990	1995	2000
Sweden	1996		
Switzerland	1996		
Taiwan	1994		
Tanzania	2001		
Turkey	1996		
Uganda	2001		
Ukraine	1996	1999	
United States	1995	1999	
Uruguay	1996		
Venezuela, RB	1996	2000	
Zimbabwe	2001		

Note: These are the surveys in which the question about confidence in political parties was asked in the second, third, and fourth wave of the WVS. We excluded surveys from China and Vietnam, since these countries are neither properly post-communist, nor (obviously) noncommunist.